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The difficulties of measuring the impact of peacebuilding efforts • Education, change and peacebuilding

zfd Brot für die Welt

Our work for change

Our work for change

Editors : Christiane Kayser and Flaubert Djateng

Building Peace

CPS/BfdW Peace Work Africa

Civil Peace Service (CPS) / BfdW –
Mano River Region, Great Lakes Region of Africa and Cameroon

Building Peace

Brot für die Welt – Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (BfdW)
(Bread for the World – Protestant Development Service)
Financed by the BMZ (Bundesministerium
für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit – German Federal
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Introduction

Results orientation, the monitoring of outcomes and impacts, has become more or less an obligation for the partner organisations in Africa and elsewhere financed by development systems. On the one hand, we can only be delighted with this shift away from the reasoning predominated by descriptions of activities and enumerations of quantitative data in reporting often devoid of meaning. One would expect all the stakeholders to want to know whether or not their work is useful and contributes to change, also to be able to re-direct their efforts if needs be. On the other hand, it may be considered regrettable that the initiative has come from the funding agencies and not from the local players engaged in social transformation.

However, it turns out to be more difficult than expected to implement monitoring systems which effectively identify the outcomes and changes we are contributing to. For we have to prevent these systems from becoming so unwieldy that they consume a large share of the energy of the people who work in the field.

Peace work and working on social change in general is even more complex than projects and programmes that focus on technical issues. "Demystifying impact", the first publication in this "Building Peace" series, is no longer available in French in hard copy, for it found a wide readership in the different African networks. Instead of ordering a reprint, we decided to get together with our colleagues from Eirene and AGEH and share the experiences that local partners, peace workers, consultants and desk officers at the head offices have had of this important and thorny task of result or impact orientation. We are all of the opinion that we can only progress if all the stakeholders make the approaches and techniques their own and adapt them to their concrete situations. It is also important to remember that essentially we are all working together towards the same goals, and that we each have a part to play. In our daily routine, however, it is easy to lose sight of the substance of what we are trying to achieve and become embroiled in mechanisms, tools, techniques, or worse — reduce everything to the demands of the funding systems to which we

are all accountable in one way or another. And so we feel it is essential to approach result or impact orientation as a learning process in which we are all learners striving for cooperation that is more useful and more effective for the people it should concern and affect in the first place: the local population in the countries and areas we work in.

We have gathered together some different perspectives on result orientation (meaning we look at outputs, outcomes and impacts, others also call this impact orientation as especially in French impact replaces results in this context): Stefan Willmutz, Günter Schönegg, Hedwig Schlags, Flaubert Djateng and Christiane Kayser ask questions and share experiences collected within the framework of the different organisations and networks of Bread for the World, AGEH and Eirene. We have included perspectives from the field from organisations in Burundi and Kenya, published by the FriEnt review called "Impulse". The experiences of partner organisations in DR Congo (CRAFOD and SADRI), from the Sahel, and Cameroon enrich the debate. In the case of the Zenü Network in Cameroon we have given the different perspectives of an outside consultant accompanying the work and the person in charge of the organisation. The annex consists of an article on the links between education, change and peace building by Professor Lynn Davies, who covers the basic concepts, in particular that of change. She raises many issues that question our usual ways of doing things. We hope this may provoke rethinking at various levels helping us create new approaches. This article was first published in "Impulse".

We hope that this publication will encourage the endeavours of the different players, of practitioners in particular, to find effective and pragmatic solutions for assessing their work and identifying the changes they influence the better to orient their work towards constructive change contributing to sustainable peace.

Flaubert Djateng and Christiane Kayser, CPS mobile team for Africa of Bread for the World – Protestant Development Service
Günter Schönegg, CPS Eirene consultant
Stefan Willmutz, CPS AGEH consultant

How can we make peacebuilding visible?

*By Flaubert Djateng**

We would like to know what happens after we intervene, to find out whether our actions make sense, out of a need to prove ourselves useful. Donors, too, want to know what happens to the money from the tax payers in their countries that they send to us: what our fees produce, what the activities they finance achieve, what the often unwieldy administrative procedures are used for. This is the explanation behind the need for "proof", to show, measure, in a word, to make visible the effects and, if possible, the impact of our work. Being able to visualize the changes originating from our action becomes of even greater concern when we work in a complex domain, on a subject that mobilises a number of players and affects several factors at the same time. Peacebuilding is one of those complex subjects that require not only being able to find the right source of leverage but also the right partners, in order to create an impact.

Achieving a result, provoking a change in the field of peacebuilding is not restricted to the number of people trained in conflict transformation techniques. Nor is it the number of lectures on peace education, or the number of petitions signed to denounce violence against women. Change or impact cannot be measured by the number of people who are members of a network or the number of operations the network organises to advocate for more peace.

Among the people working for peace in the world, there are the CPS networks facilitated and supported by BfdW. The members are a

* CPS Mobile team for Africa, Bread for the World (BfdW)

variety of stakeholders working for Church organisations or civil society as a whole. These partners in peace building deploy their efforts daily to further the cause of peace in their region, country and the world. With the population, they carry out a large number of widely varying activities, from physical activities such as pottery or food production to mobilisation such as advocacy and awareness-raising campaigns to boost peace. At first sight we may well wonder whether the activities of the networks actually build peace. How can setting up a theatre group facilitate peace among people? How can doing the accounts for a small organisation in the village build peace? How can food-producing activities that employ young people be considered useful for peace? The answers to these questions are only meaningful in close relation to the intervention context.

The impact of the activities in terms of enhancing the living conditions of people can be measured through an analysis of the context before, during and after the action.

The result or the change we are seeking can only be detected by observing the interactions between the people who share the same living space. It is a question of showing the differences brought about by our presence; of seeing how these differences contribute to enhancing the communal well-being of the people involved. To make these differences, this change visible, an approach should be adopted that enables the differentiation of the outputs of our work and the results from using these outputs. For in fact, when we carry out an activity, at the outcome there is an identifiable output in the domain of skills and know-how, in terms of conflict resolution procedures, production techniques, legal documents, petitions, or knowledge of the behaviour and habits of the people encountered. It is the use of such knowledge that brings change to the people's lives. This use can be expressed as a skill that provides knowledge of the leverage points for change or the major players who can help bring about change, through people skills that alter behaviour patterns and attitudes, enabling negotiations or *rapprochements* between the parties to a conflict.

To make these changes visible, it is necessary to circumscribe with whom and for whom we are working, but also to have a strategy that that shows clearly what our aims are, how and why we are working, and what our vision is. Then we must realise the necessity of having indicators that show us when something has changed. These indicators touch on the political, economic and cultural.

By *political*, we mean decision-making processes, the representation and defence of interests, the quality of relations between stakeholders, the formulation of regulatory texts, regulation and governance systems, processes for selection or the acquisition of responsibilities, in short, everything related to the management of power, and the related tools and systems.

Our work will have a political impact if the factors listed above change and influence the lives of the people in a given place. For example, when SADRI in DRC runs capacity building activities with the peace teams in potential conflict sites; when it creates a forum for dialogue and agreement among multiple players, supports advocacy in the field of mining; if all this work influences the governance of mining in the area, leading to the mining companies improving their exercise of social responsibility, then SADRI will have had an impact on a political level.

By *economic*, we mean income level, investments, inflation rate, unemployment level, whether or not existing potential is exploited, the circulation of goods and related flows, the major business stakeholders, entrepreneurship, the quality of services, taxes and fiscal questions, corruption, in short, everything related to the production and distribution of wealth.

Heal Africa's 30 Wamama Sinameni networks (women's empowerment and self-promotion) have facilitated the development of savings and microcredit among rural women, the basis for achieving income generating activities. The expansion of this women's network has facil-

itated the creation of jobs and the production of wealth. Where there is work, young people are less idle and less likely to be manipulated for political ends or to be recruited into militia groups that disturb the peace.

By *cultural*, we mean customs and traditions, taboos, the relations between social groups, representation and management of identities, cultural influences, interactions between faith communities, religious groups, gender relations, management of tribalism and ethnicity, in short, everything that is related to the habits and behaviour of people who share the same living space.

In Cameroon, CIPCRE's work on widowhood rites and the inter-denominational dialogue promoted by ACADIR are activities that change habits and behaviour within society. If CIPCRE succeeds in instigating new, more humane widowhood practices, taking care to respect the rights of women (the most concerned), and altering the attitude of men and community leaders, this would be an example of an impact on a cultural level in the field of women's rights. Decision-making in this case could also be profitable on a political level. A successful inter-denominational dialogue is one that facilitates the *rapprochement* of faith communities, organises exchanges and allows tolerance for a better way of living together that respects the faith of others.

Political, economic and cultural changes are visible on three levels. First of all, change can be *individual*: people learn and use things individually and in their families. In this case, a person adopts a new practice, a new way of doing something, or an individual gains better control over their emotions, which changes their perception of others. Then there is the level of the *groups* that individual people frequent. In companies, in cultural groups, non-profit organisations, meetings, the churches — how these groups change. Lastly, this can also be observed in *the community, and the broader society*. True, lasting changes are those that affect all three levels simultaneously. These are changes that help the

members of a community to analyse together the factors that influence their lives, decide together what should be done to elicit positive change, divide up the roles and act in concert to enhance the way they live together at the different stages of their lives. The elements that identify each level are to be found on page 28 of the brochure *"Demystifying Impact: Our Work for Change"*, available on the CPS website: www.peaceworkafrica.net

In conclusion, making change visible requires an approach that incorporates the different factors and the different levels. This way of working should also include the time dimension — in other words, the short, medium and long term. The diagram below, based on work with our partners in four African countries, summarises the path our work takes and gives a few indications of how to identify the impact of our activities.

Flaubert Djateng
Bafoussam, February 2013


Our actions and change (outcomes and impacts) – by Flaubert Djateng
Initial situation
CHANGE
Target situation
Goals and indicators
Activities/ sub activities
Outputs
Use of outputs
Changes effects/impacts
• information, communication
• capacity building
• advocacy
• networking
...
Knowledge
Know-how Skills
POLITICAL
ECONOMIC
CULTURAL
1) individual
2) associations, groups, enterprises, Churches...
3) communi-ties, society
Key players:
• Youth (ex-combattants, diggers, Kuluna)
• Women (survivors, widows, etc.)
• Rural population (farmers)
• Decision-makers (Church leaders, Adm,...)
• Journalists
• Elected representatives
• Private enterprises (mines, etc.)
• Cultural associations, artists
• Security (Army, police)
• Legal documents (memorandum, decree, law, etc.)
• Statistics
• Custom
• Taboos
• Behaviour patterns
...
• Context analysis
• Identification of insecurity factors
• Id. manipulation systems
• Id. levers for change
• Decision process
• Major players
• New approach
• Educational documents (technical sheets, manuals)
Changes that last are those with an influence on all 3 levels
Social skills Attitudes
Analyse together
Act together
Live together

What kind of change and for whom?

Results or impact orientation – an approach that is technically straight-forward but politically complex...

*By Christiane Kayser**

The theory is crystal clear: if we are working for change, development and peace, we should be keen to check whether our work is having the desired result. If we finance such activities with tax payers' money, we should be able to verify whether they are serving a purpose. All the more so as the criticism of funding for development and peace-related work in the countries of the Southern hemisphere, some of it valid and some not, which has been around for many years, is now — due to the crisis in the West — becoming increasingly strident.

It is only logical, therefore, to insist on orientation geared towards monitoring and describing the outcomes and impacts of this work.

The situation is nonetheless more complicated than it appears. We are faced with players who are very different and whose cultures, goals and ways of doing things are also very different, and sometimes even contradictory. Despite the negotiating of contracts, the formulating of programmes and projects that are joint and have common objectives, differences very often prevail over synergies.

In their excellent 2010 study on the mechanisms and impacts of what is still sometimes called "aid", two researchers from the research institution LASDEL in Niger give field workers the chance to speak.[1]

1 Philippe Lavigne Delville and Aghali Abdelkader: "A cheval donné, on ne regarde pas les dents" Les mécanismes et les impacts de l'aide vus par des praticiens nigériens, Niamey 2010, LASDEL, études et travaux No 83, www. lasdel.net

* CPS mobile team for Africa, BfdW

"The international organisations have appropriated development. There is a total disempowerment that goes with Amadou Hampaté Ba's proverb which says that the hand that gives is always above the hand that receives. We have created a bunch of bilateral, governmental and non-governmental organisations and they each have their messianic vision or ideological discourse to justify their intervention. In the United Nations institutions, they define the truth and then send apparatchiks into the field to preach the good word, and it has to be gotten across in every country. The people on the ground in Niger, here, better get results, otherwise they'll have their knuckles rapped. And as most career paths are not guaranteed, they have to make it work. So they pull on the stalks of the millet to make it grow. That way never made a millet stalk grow. It can uproot it but not make it grow. (expatriate technical assistant)"

The first point is that, even though there is a sort of mutual dependency between the players — for nothing can be done in the field without field players — the money in the hand of the donor creates an imbalance which has repercussions at every level and in most cases prevents the local organisations from appropriating the concepts and tools. Not talking about money, treating it as if it were "dirty", is no doubt not a solution, either. In addition, as the authors of the study emphasise, the image of the millet stalk eloquently evokes the discrepancies in the time-frames of donors, institutions and local organisations: Even when the innovations induced from the outside are pertinent, the time-frames imposed by the donors or the international institutions do not allow the local organisations to evolve, or the stakeholders to appropriate new ideas or skills and really master them. Even more serious is the fact that the time-frames exclude the possibility of innovation and creativity. As a consequence, they are constantly under pressure, forced to follow and submit to trends and changes, instead of being able to integrate them and take responsibility for them.

This a problem of time frames that do not match, of differences in pace that dominate everything.

"There are donors who have money that has to be spent by a fixed date, and that's what they call efficiency, whereas for the population money can't be spent so quickly. In some cooperative projects, this is the principal criterion. Their head office will tell them: 'If you haven't spent it, you didn't need it', and the funding they receive for the following year will be cut. They are assessed on spending ability. (consultant)

There isn't too much money, the needs are immense. But there isn't enough time. By the time people start to shake off their vision and appropriate new ideas the project is over. A project that lasts 4 or 5 years, if there is no follow-up, everything is lost. It's not that it wasn't relevant, it's just that it didn't correspond to the speed people evolve at. In the areas where there have been projects that were working well and were stopped, people are discouraged. (consultant)." (Lavigne Delville et al.)

In peace work, this problem is all the more acute as a culture of peace and negotiation of interests does not develop in time phases that match the projects and programmes funded.

Furthermore, we expect outcomes and even impacts after one, two or three years without taking into account the fact that contrary to technical and infrastructure changes, changes in mentality or behaviour take time and are not easy to measure. It sometimes happens that the real changes in behaviour emerge after the project has finished.

The whole chain of players who intervene now depends on result and impact oriented reporting. This is no doubt progress compared to the technical reports that focused on action and numbers — of participants at workshops, for example — which mean nothing in relation to the changes initiated. But it is almost impossible for practitioners to appropriate the concept of effect or impact in a professional environment dominated by the pace of the donors and their demands.

The pace is too fast on the one hand and too slow, not synchronised with the daily lives of the so-called "beneficiaries". What can be draw from the following observation from a consultant from the same study in Niger?

"In the North of the country, I was doing a project evaluation. In a discussion with a group of women, I asked: 'What has been the best project you have known?'. The women were silent. Then one woman said 'Celtel'! I asked her why: 'If I have no money left, I call my son who lives in town, and so I can eat. If my daughter is about to give birth, I call him and he sends me the money. You, with your projects, when we have a priority, it comes 3 or 4 years later. We've forgotten, or it is no longer our priority: We managed to find another solution in the meantime!' (consultant)."

Are we capable of learning from this important impact of the introduction of the mobile phone in rural and urban daily life in Africa?

No result or impact orientation without appropriate, conscious change strategies

Since impact monitoring and impact orientation are "in fashion", there are innumerable training and capacity-building courses on the subject. Very often these courses are schematic and systematised. We have noticed that it is difficult for the stakeholders to adapt them to their specific situation. Often they are too unwieldy. I remember an impact chain presented by a "specialist" as part of a programme in Senegal which covered all the walls of the room but only one of the programme's four objectives. We were all speechless and didn't know whether to laugh or cry. Most of the schematic tools are too heavy and in every case they require concrete, radical adaptation on a case-by-case basis.

In addition, impact monitoring is rarely connected to the development of a strategy specific to the initiative or organisation. How do you identify the desired or unwanted changes you have contributed to if you are not very clear about the changes targeted at various levels that you have to monitor regularly to readjust your ways of doing and learn from your mistakes and wrong tracks?

Who is responsible for the strategies? When a project is underway, are the technical and financial partners willing to agree to re-orientations if they understand their validity in relation to the common goal? There is often a swarm of intermediaries and they all prefer to avoid change in order to reduce the hours of bureaucratic work and justification with respect to those who are situated a notch further away from the realities in the field. Those who should be acting as "translators" or intermediaries between the field and the headquarters of the donors — the consultants, country or regional managers, etc. — seem to be having more and more difficulty having these realities acknowledged because they are considered less important than the rules and conditions of the funding agency or of the funders of the funding agency.

Are the local stakeholders working according to a rationale of change for their society or to a rationale of justification towards the funding bodies? How can they shoulder their responsibilities in relation to the population they are working with, often called "target" in the technocratic language?

In our first publication in the "Building peace" series, we tried to present a number of principles and adaptable tools drawn from experiences with the partners, particularly in DR Congo. Eight years later, the French version of this publication is out of print and at the same time, things have changed. We have made mistakes and learnt lessons, we have lost some illusions, but we are not abandoning hope that the efforts of maintaining the conversation on obstacles to change can help us to make progress little by little.

Results or impact orientation is not a technical tool — even if there is a large number of methods and techniques that can usefully be adapted —, it's a strategic and political process that implies the empowerment of the stakeholders in the field and a certain degree of resistence against the trends of the development theatre, but also against the rules and conditions imposed by the aid systems and the donors in general. As in any process where divergent interests clash, non-violent negotiation should be fostered that is productive for both sides. And

this brings us to the key questions: What are the means of exerting pressure and what are the powers at the disposal of what Hampaté Ba calls "the hand that receives"? If the local stakeholders become aware of their means and powers and the donors accept a certain degree of reciprocity, this would already be a major step towards the necessary cooperation of both hands. Will "the hand that receives" be bold enough to fight for adjustments the necessity of which can only be seen when working in the field? Will "the hand that gives" understand that both must work together to achieve sustainable impacts?

Berlin, March 2013

Challenges of result orientation in Civil Peace Service Projects

*By Stefan Willmutz**

It is very hot today and the humidity is so high, that everybody feels exhausted. Although the sun outside is burning hot during these early afternoon hours, the motivation of all those attending the workshop is still very high. One can feel the commitment amongst the twelve participants of this workshop, consisting of the project implementing team and several resource persons. The discussion revolves around overall goals and immediate results of peace education, what to focus on and about "our contribution" to a more peaceful society. We are in the middle of a planning workshop of the Justice and Peace Commission of a catholic diocese in an African country. The group is planning the implementation of a three-year project for peace education in catholic schools in the diocese. It is supported by the Association for Development Cooperation (AGEH), which supplies a qualified peace education expert, who is a member of the implementing team. The workshop is facilitated by a local consultant for planning, monitoring and evaluation (PME), who uses a methodology which concentrates on results. The group already defined the project vision, which reflects the large changes that the project hopes to encourage, and as well the mission, which describes how the project intends to contribute to that vision. Right now the group is carrying out a stakeholder analysis. Direct partners will be chosen, i.e. the individuals, groups or organizations with

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which the project will directly interact. Soon the workshop will proceed to the next steps, such as defining the desired outcomes and the progress markers.

The project belongs to the Civil Peace Service Program (CPS) of AGEH, which is funded by the German federal government. Through this program AGEH collaborates with over 60 partner organizations in more than ten countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The partner organizations are mainly NGOs and catholic organizations, many of them Catholic Justice and Peace Commissions. All these organizations are working for peace, which is of course a very challenging task. Peace is a big word, a tremendous challenge. What does it mean precisely, how can it be reached? What exactly can be our contribution and which of the numerous peace topics should we focus on? These are only some of the questions partners are facing, and these questions are leading to a broad range of challenges regarding the achievement of significant results in Civil Peace Service Projects. For many years AGEH has supported its partners in results-oriented planning, monitoring and evaluation. During various sessions, discussions and workshops many of these challenges have come up. Not all of them are linked only with peace or development work, but all are relevant and are not easy to meet. In the following some of these challenges shall be elaborated:

As already mentioned before, one of the main challenges is to get a **clear focus on the topic and strategy of the project**. Catholic Justice and Peace Commissions especially are feeling responsible to campaign against all kinds of conflicts, violence and injustice within their territory, e. g. the area of an entire diocese. They feel obliged to serve "their people". But situation and context analysis with Diocesan Justice and Peace Commissions often show eight or more core topics, for example, domestic violence, human rights' violations, mob justice, bad governance, ethnically or religiously charged conflicts, conflicts over resources (land, water). Usually the project has to deal with limited resources such as staff, time and money. Therefore the choice is between either working on many topics and only scratching the surface or select-

ing one or two core topics and being able to tackle them more deeply. The consequence of selecting one or two core topics only, is to drop other important topics, which is of course not an easy decision, because partners are usually dealing with serious threats to peace. Furthermore, dropping topics requires accepting that the organization will not be able to serve all of the people the project would like to serve. Otherwise, if the project tries to work on many topics it will be very difficult to see clearly visible results which have been reached by the project.

A second challenge CPS projects face is the **result orientation**, meaning to be guided by the desired changes at the close of a CPS project — or even later. Looking into the future, describing clearly the changes the project would like to see after three or more years and taking this as a point of reference for the elaboration of immediate results, progress markers, strategies and activities. Ideally all of these planning steps should be oriented towards the desired changes, the results, because this is what really counts: the contribution to changes, such as to play a part in nonviolent conflict resolution. Actually many projects are more activity-oriented. The focus of their planning is on the activities the project would like to carry out tomorrow, next week or next month, such as workshops, field visits, campaigns, etc. Later on, after the implementation of these activities, the results will be collected. Projects which work results-oriented are able to gear their activities to the finally desired changes. Projects which focus on the activities may be at risk of getting lost in their activities and losing the orientation. These projects often regard the activities carried out as results. However, an accomplished series of workshops is just a first step, but not already a result.

As many projects have to deal with limited resources they are suffering from a heavy workload. Often there are too many things to work on in combination with a limited number of staff. The daily business doesn't leave space and time for reflection, exchange or discussion. Everybody is busy with his or her own tasks. These conditions hamper a **systematic and regular project management**, understood as periodi-

cal meetings, timely planning, constant monitoring and proper evaluation. Furthermore, the organizations are usually based in conflict or post-conflict zones and in regions which are constantly facing a variety of threats. Occurrences like humanitarian or political crises, natural disasters or another outbreak of violence require immediate reaction, which reduces even more the opportunities to implement and conduct a systematic project management.

Another challenge regarding result orientation in CPS projects is the **balance between accountability and learning**. Systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation (PME) usually have been established in order to ensure accountability. The donor wants to know whether the project operates in line with the project goals and if the money has been spent according to the financial principles. The project wants to provide proper financial and narrative reports. Accountability is very important and of course a good reason to establish a PME system. But the learning aspect should not be left out, as is often the case. Systematic project management could provide lots of precious information about which goal, which progress marker and which activity was helpful and why. This information is crucial to the further development of the project. The project implementing team could learn which activity should be kept in order to achieve the desired change, which one must be adapted or even dropped. Which of the goals and progress markers are realistic and achievable, which should be adapted or completely changed? It seems that some CPS projects focus mainly on accountability and do not perceive the relevance of systematic project management for learning, therefore missing the opportunities to become more professional.

In this regard the fifth challenge should be mentioned, which is the **ownership** for PME, respectively for systematic project management. As PME systems are often established on the recommendation and with support of a donor agency, the ownership of PME with the local organization is weak. The project carries out PME activities because of the recommendation of the donor and less because of a conviction that

thereby the project's achievements would be improved. However, real ownership by the local partner organization is required to establish systematic project management successfully. Ownership increases e.g. through the practical experience, that PME can be helpful for the daily work, for a better project performance and more professionalism. Therefore partners should not only be trained in PME, but additionally be accompanied by PME professionals during the application of the PME methodology to their projects.

A further challenge for result orientation might equally be the decision, **which PME system should be applied**. There are many different systems in use, e.g. the Logical Framework Approach, Results-Based Management, Project Cycle Management or Outcome Mapping. As many local organizations do not have their own system, they are doing project management along the structure of project application forms or the outline of a narrative report of their respective donor. The consequence is often, that different ways of project management are being used at the same time. For example five different systems of project management and PME are applied within the same organization in five projects, funded by five different donors. In practice this is of course a lot of work. An alternative could be to develop the project's own PME system on the basis of the project's own experiences, using this system for all the different projects an organization is carrying out. The advantage would be to use only one system for all the different projects. This would allow the gaining of more experience through applying the same planning and monitoring steps and therefore to become more professional with one's own system.

It would allow as well using always the same wording when carrying out planning, monitoring and evaluation activities, including the same definition of terms within the project and within the organization. This could be very helpful, because in the area of project management and PME the **confusion of wording** is another big challenge. Although there are initiatives for common wording and common definitions, many donor organizations use a different wording and different interpreta-

tion of the same term. Just the term "result" has many related terms, e.g. "effect", "aim", "goal", "impact", "outcome" or "output", often in combination with terms like "immediate …", "overall …", "direct …", "long-term …", etc., which are often not clearly distinguished from each other. In situations like this there are few possible solutions. One might be to learn the wording of every single donor agency including their definitions; another might be just to develop one's own system including wording and definitions, using this system within all one's own projects.

Finally another challenge should be mentioned, which is the development of a clear and feasible **theory of change**, consisting of clear and viable results and a realistic concept about how to reach the desired changes. Some projects carry out lots of workshops with large attendance figures and for example ten major subjects (like human rights, domestic violence, nonviolent conflict resolution, etc.) to be treated within five days. All subjects are burning issues in the area and projects hope by working on all the relevant topics they will be contributing to a more peaceful society. Support and follow-up activities sometimes are not provided. One hopes that the more people have been trained, the knowledge will diffuse and infiltrate into the society, which as a consequence will become more peaceful. As both sides, donors as well as local partner organizations are hoping for large numbers and quick success, there is a temptation to believe that this will work. However, in reality peace work is troublesome and long-winded and even small changes are difficult to accomplish. Therefore it is wise to be modest with expectations regarding the project's achievements and to plan for proper support and follow-up activities, such as field visits, refresher courses, experience sharing, peer learning groups, etc. The change of a violent behavior into a nonviolent behavior needs time as well as constant support and even small steps forward usually can be considered a big success.

Considering all these challenges, the Association for Development Cooperation (AGEH) started in 2007 searching for opportunities to

support their local partner organizations within the Civil Peace Service Program. With Outcome Mapping, a method was identified, which appeared to be helpful to meet several of the above mentioned challenges. Created between 1998 and 2000 by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC, Canada), Outcome Mapping provides a results-oriented approach focusing on outcomes, understood as changes in the behavior of individuals, groups or organizations with whom the project works directly. Moreover the method aims at strengthening local ownership and learning as well as achieving a better balance between accountability and learning.

Later AGEH started to adapt Outcome Mapping to the needs of their Civil Peace Service Program by adding new steps and customizing some of the original ones. The result is a system for **R**esult **O**riented Project **Ma**nagement called "ROMA", consisting of four stages: Analysis, Planning, Monitoring and (Self-) Evaluation. Roma is used as an integrated and flexible tool set for the management of development and peace projects with a systemic focus and oriented on outcomes. In line with Outcome Mapping, ROMA is based on three key concepts:

A) The **complexity of change** in development and peace processes as part of an interconnected system of actors, factors and relationships.
B) The **sphere of direct influence**: planning and monitoring is focused on the sphere of direct influence.
C) ROMA defines **Outcomes as changes in the behaviour of the local stakeholders** (Direct Partners) and enforces solution-oriented thinking instead of problem-oriented thinking.

In 2008 AGEH started to support the PME processes of its CPS partner organizations by providing assistance in the facilitation of workshops for planning, monitoring and evaluation by local or international consultants, professionals in PME and ROMA. The majority of partners did, and still does, accept the offer, which includes one comprehensive planning workshop at the beginning of the usually three-year project, a

minimum of two monitoring workshops and one self-evaluation workshop close to the project termination. While in the beginning many workshops have been facilitated by an international PME consultant, currently most workshops are facilitated by local consultants and local CPS PME Officers, as for instance in projects in Columbia, Israel and Palestine, Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda and the Great Lakes Region in Africa. Today AGEH relies in these areas on a total of five local PME experts who constantly support the CPS projects. A recently carried out self evaluation of AGEH's PME support within the Civil Peace Service Program highlighted interesting results, such as that many learning processes within the projects have been initiated, projects dedicate much more time to planning, monitoring and evaluation, try to prove their theory of change and to define more realistic goals, work more strongly in a result oriented manner and strengthen the learning aspect within their work. The project seems to be well on the way, even if progress in the field of results-oriented project management is coming slowly and the above mentioned challenges are still relevant.

It is getting late at the planning workshop for peace education of the diocesan Justice and Peace Commission in that African country. The workshop started two days ago, but the discussion process has taken its time. The implementing team has decided to finish the planning process today, even though it is getting dark already. The time is well invested. Eventually all relevant planning steps have been carried out. The desired results are defined as intended behavioral changes and linked with progress markers to track the project's progress and the achievement of the desired results. A plan for self-evaluation has been carried out as well. The main aim of the workshop, to develop a common and very practical working basis for the upcoming three years has been achieved. The project has a proper structure now and it has gained more clarity. A strong foundation and a good starting point for a reasonable Civil Peace Service project.

Observing results in the context of an armed conflict – methodology challenges and limits

*By Günter Schönegg**

In December 2010, the "Coordination Committee for Actions for Peace" (CCAP) network in Uvira, in the Province of Sud-Kivu in Eastern DR Congo, succeeded in triggering the demobilisation and reinsertion of 8 armed groups in the High Plateau of Fizi. Through advocacy and dialogue, the CCAP network was able to found an intervention strategy which is progressing nicely. An exchange between the network and the other key players in the region (UN, government, etc.) explored the theme of monitoring and evaluating the effects of the CCAP's contribution.

The armed groups in Fizi (South-Sud-Kivu) emerged in a context of violent ethnic conflicts between the Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge), who settled in the region during the colonial period, and the indigenous ethnic groups. Over the decades, these conflicts have provoked a lots of violence and have been continually instrumentalised by politicians from all sides. The armed groups define themselves as self-defence militia for their respective ethnic groups and are most often created by officers who have deserted from the national army. They often finance themselves through the mineral trade and pillaging the local population.

The CCAP is supported by the NGO EIRENE (International Christian Service for Peace). The network is involved in the reconciliation

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of the different communities in the region of Fizi (South-Sud-Kivu). From the end of 2008, the CCAP decided to broach the problem of the presence of armed groups and the 2009 planning workshop chose to implement a multidimensional strategy. On the one hand, the population had to be mobilised to disassociate from "their" armed groups and on the other hand the provincial government had to be convinced not only to negotiate with these groups but also to set up a reinsertion scheme. The aim consisted in organising a conversation between all the players to develop perspectives for a solution. Three direct target groups were defined: the local populations and their opinion leaders, the provincial government and the leaders of the armed groups. Edifying results were recorded — among others we can mention the Banyamulenge FRF rebellion agreeing to its dissolution almost immediately after exchanges in December 2010 and the dissolution of eight (8) "Mai-Mai" militia hostile to the FRF.

The following questions are currently on the agenda:

- The temporal proximity of the events shows a cause and effect link, but can this link be proven? It is clear that there are many influencing factors; the FRF were considered a key actor in the conflict and many national and international players tried to convince them, no doubt with considerable financial resources to encourage them. Also, at the same time, the national army had increased the pressure through their Amani Leo offensive.

- The security situation has not greatly improved since these events, and after 2011 we even observed an increase in violence. No-one can say with certainty the role played in this new wave of violence by ex-combatants who have not been integrated. For the moment, we cannot exclude the hypothesis that indirect results on the level of the security of the population have been somewhat negative.

Faced with these questions, the CCAP organised a workshop in September 2012 to capitalise on experience, the better to grasp their role and contribution. The testimonies provided qualitative observations such as:

1. Through dialogue, the CCAP mediators were able to convince the leaders of the FRF to accept the fact that a solution through negotiations with the government was possible and promising.
2. New perspectives and options for a solution emerged.
3. With the support of the local leaders, the CCAP delegation was able to create a new foundation of trust.

While qualitative observations are possible, quantification is methodologically difficult. How can we measure factors such as "the resuming of dialogue and the restoring of trust"? How can we compare them with other factors (pressure, stimulation, etc.)? It is not identifying indicators that poses a problem but collecting data, which requires disproportional resources in a context of violence, in an area that is difficult to access. There was no lack of indicators and the methods for monitoring in such a context are available. The essential approach is based on questioning target groups and their social environment (interviews, questionnaires, structured or less structured, oral or written, etc.). The value of the results of these questions remains limited as there are too many factors that interfere with the results, such as the interviewee's misunderstanding, expectations and interests. For monitoring to be exhaustive, it should combine interrogative methods with target group observation methods.

The following factors are essential for obtaining reliable results:

1. The existence of a basic study — that provides information on the starting point concerning our indicators (a reference situation). This basic data is often lacking in peace projects.
2. The possibility of observing the target group during a significant period. In the case of an armed group, this is obviously almost impossible.

3. Reference (control) groups, against which we can compare the changes at the level of our target group. Here again, it is naturally difficult at the level of violent players, but also for other key players. Key players are by definition different from other players.

There is much that can be done scientifically, if the resources are available. But the reality of the projects is such that financial and human resources are very limited.

One thing that could help would be a solid theory of change, a general model to describe the relationship between the different contributions (broadening of perspectives, trust, improved communication, etc.) and their cumulative effects with other factors.

Five years after – Demystifying Impact

The perspective of Brot für die Welt – Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst on Outcome and Impact Orientation

*By Hedwig Schlags**

In 2007 the *Coordination and Assistance Team of the Civil Peace Service in the African Great Lakes Region* published a booklet named "Demystifying Impact: Our Work for Change". In this booklet the authors' team compiled opinions and experiences of CPS partners, especially Congolese organisations, with the concept of "impact". From there a framework was developed that could be fitting for the special nature of CPS work. "Think and act in terms of change" was the guiding principle of the booklet.

Demystifying impact – I liked this title when I read it the first time. Haven't there been lots of mysteries, confusions, and half-truths around that topic since the starting of the discourse? So, when Christiane Kayser asked me to contribute something to the second issue of "Demystifying impact" I spontaneously agreed.

In 2007 both organisations Brot für die Welt and Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst started separate processes towards focussing on "outcome and impact". Challenged by the mainstream debate in development cooperation, and encouraged by their own experiences, they wanted to intensify their efforts in assessing the "outcome and impact"

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of their work and at the same time qualify the communication of achieved changes with the public.

Five years after – What has happened since 2007 in both our organisations? Well, apart from the fact that we merged into one organisation in 2012 many steps have been taken to make this process of focussing on outcome and impact a joint venture. From 2009 we regularly participated in one another's working group meetings that dealt with the implementation of outcome and impact orientation in our organisations. From there the "Joint Framework on Outcome and Impact Orientation" was developed. It passed the joint screening committee of Brot für die Welt and Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst in November 2010. For another one and a half years training courses have been organized for the staff of both organisations. Those trainings gave an introduction into the common understanding on outcome and impact, on the theoretical concepts behind it as well as on methods and instruments for assessing outcome and impact in the project context.

Five years have passed since we started. In the meantime we can say much more clearly what we want to talk about. We know now that focussing on outcome and impact means focussing on observing changes. Furthermore, it is of interest whether there are causal or plausible relations between the observed changes and our (project-) interventions. The Joint Framework says:

"Effects (Outcome and Impact) are changes due directly or indirectly to a project or intervention. The maintaining of status quo or the hindrance of deterioration may also be an effect."[1]

The latter aspect is of utmost importance for CPS projects. Here, in many cases it may be crucial to "avert the threat of deterioration, i.e. maintain a status quo."[2]

1 See Brot für die Welt / Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst, Joint Framework on Outcome and Impact Orientation, January 2011, p. 3.

2 See Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst, Position Paper on Outcome and Impact Monitoring, May 2007, p. 2.

Among the extremes – keep the balance!

Some say that the current emphasis on "impact analysis" or "measuring of results" means a change in paradigm. Everything we did before seems useless to them or of less value. They think we have to re-invent development and to revise all our concepts.

Others say there is nothing new about it — just new wine in old skins! Just wait for some time and it will go again like any other fashion or trend in development!

Some are very demanding when it comes to systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation (PME). They say that financing agencies have to clearly define what the terms around "impact" mean and what the differences between f.i. "outcome" and "output" are. They think you can avoid even the smallest misunderstanding by prescribing what is required. They don't tolerate any unsettled question or doubts around the topic.

Others say: No, you may not prescribe anything. You may not intervene into partners' work and processes. You have to keep things completely free to partner organisations. It is solely their business how to plan and measure the success of their work.

Demystifying impact – how we understand it

It is no longer the time for extreme positions. What we need and want is a framework for our dialogue. It should enable us to understand each other better when it comes to "outcome and impact". This is our basic understanding: We may speak of outcome or impact whenever change is involved. Also the use of the outputs of a project may indicate a change. **Example: People who underwent the training in conflict resolution have started local committees for conflict resolution.** However, the output alone does not suffice to make us speak of a change. **Example: The participants know about conflict mechanisms and discuss**

Table on "Results/Effect Chain"[3]

	Results/Effect Chain[4]	*Example from CPS*[5]	Planning table in line with the Logical Framework Analysis (LFA)[6]
Effects	**Impact** Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced directly or indirectly by an intervention, intended or unintended.	A visible contribution to a culture of peace in the area is being made.	**Goal** The higher-order objective to which a development project is intended to contribute.
Effects	**Outcome** The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs. These may be positive or negative, intended or non-intended.	Local conflicts (estimated number?) are being solved with participation of all stakeholders (...). *Negative:* For some time conflicts become more due to increased awareness. *Non-intended:* More people from surrounding communities ask for training.	**Project objective** The description of a situation strived for, which shall be reached through a concrete project.
Effects	*Use of Outputs*	People who underwent the training in conflict resolution have started local committees for conflict resolution.	
	Output The products, capital goods and services that result from a project or activity.	The participants know about conflict mechanisms and discuss them during training sessions.	**Output** The immediate products and services produced by a project.
	Activities Actions taken or work performed through which inputs such as financial means, services from technical cooperation and other forms of resources are mobilised to reach specific outputs.	◆ Provide training space ◆ offer trainings ◆ develop training concept ◆ offer supervision ◆ do an evaluation ◆ ...	**Activities** The steps taken by a project holder to reach planned outputs and objectives.
	Inputs Financial, human and material resources used for an activity.	◆ funding for training space ◆ CPS professional ◆ ...	**Input** Resources needed in order to implement planned activities.

them during training sessions. The proven knowledge of people in a special field does not automatically mean that they use this knowledge.

Outcome refers to direct short-term and medium-term changes whereas **Impact** is long-term and relates to overall goals (like peace, justice and good governance in broader contexts).

The table opposite taken from the framework of Brot für die Welt – Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst may illustrate the different levels of change within an "effect chain":

Stay realistic!

The distinction between the different levels reflected in the table on page 36 helps to assess our own contribution to change realistically. It prevents us from being too demanding with regard to the effects of our interventions. It shows the limit of our influence and where "success" and "failure" depend on factors other than our actions. It also provides space for the unexpected, non-intended and maybe surprising things. In no way it represents a corselet that keeps us from breathing. It is more a path of orientation that may facilitate our communication.

A word on "orientation"

The concept of "Outcome and Impact Orientation" does not mean that we all — people working in the financing organisations and people working in the partner countries — lack orientation for what we are doing. The term "orientation" was chosen in order to comprise the whole

3 See Joint Framework, January 2011, p. 6

4 On all levels our partners are requested to consider, what change means in the reality of men and women and how far inputs, activities and outputs are of benefit to men or to women respectively.

5 Example added by the author.

6 See 4.

process of reflecting, planning, monitoring, reporting, and evaluating when it comes to changes. It allows us to include the unexpected and unplanned changes (positive or negative) also. According to the joint framework on "Outcome and Impact Orientation" of Brot für die Welt – Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst observing the unexpected and non-intended is of great relevance. The framework stresses the importance of staying open for developments in the process of implementation that could not be foreseen. However, they have to be communicated to the funding organisation. Accordingly our PME reporting format contains two questions about unexpected outcome and impact.

Another five years – what remains to be done?

It is safe to assume that it will take us another five years to finalize this orientation on outcome and impact. For this we want to intensify the communication with our partners and with professionals working in our partner countries. This includes training offers as well as the facilitation of dialogue. Secondly we have to enlarge our knowledge on methods and instruments for assessing change and concentrate on those that are practicable and affordable with existing budgets. Last but not least we in the financing organisations have to strengthen processes of learning from outcome and impact and use the information better for the building of our strategies and for our communication with public and private donors.

Impact Assessment in Peacebuilding: Views from the Field

Centre Ubuntu, Burundi

*By Fr. Emmanuel Ntakarutimana**

The socio-political crisis that shook Burundi for the last five decades was the origin of many large-scale massacres, forced disappearances and rough executions in many corners of the country. The death of hundreds of thousands in the last 50 years of open or dormant conflicts have undoubtedly caused, amongst the population of Burundi a climate of mistrust, hatred, and exclusion between different identities of Burundians. The growing sociopolitical stabilization of the country needs a tremendous work of healing.

Challenges

1. Community ownership of processes: If change has to happen, it is crucial to have local people and communities own the processes and work with their stories. They are the best specialists of their life and community settings. This process may take time as facilitators have to negotiate with gatekeepers and have people negotiate solution to their problems through an appropriate forum. In wounded communities, the pace may be very slow.

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2. **Fragile post-conflicts renaissance**: We experience the difficulty to set up activities having in mind outcomes, medium and long term impact in a fragile political set up that has to deal with new arrangements, especially from Transitional Justice mechanisms generating hopes and fear at the same time.

3. **From activities and programs orientation to generating a culture**: It is not easy to win a long-term engagement in promoting a culture of peace as peace-building does not work with a hit-and run approach. It is a process that requires creating structures and capacities for long term work with regular monitoring and evaluation to strengthen staff and all community stakeholders.

4. **Hardship in attribution of causality**: The link between overall and intermediary results and between these and peace building dynamics is still weak. Attribution of causality is hard to define. The fruits of social peacebuilding may not be harvested for years while the yeast is working. The healing of communities while developing a renewed leadership and setting up a new sociopolitical setup able to strengthen the social fabric requires complex undertaking not easy to coordinate.

Response

Centre Ubuntu's programs target to work with a range of people, including Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, returnees, IDPs, prisoners, former prisoners, demobilized combatants, child soldiers, victims and perpetrators of violence, and local populations. Centre Ubuntu requires that the heterogeneous groups that engage with it work as a community, which is an important strategy toward helping different peoples appreciate and understand the each other. The centre communicates bunt values, promotes psychosocial community healing, networks with relevant stakeholders (such as other civil society organizations, government

and community institutions, international donors, and research institutes), and thus create opportunities via social capital.

After the community mobilization phase, collective opinion was that building the local capacity of the communities was most important. Joint discussions brought out that more training in five specific areas was needed:

1. Rebuilding the Value basis and engaging in lobbying and advocacy for vulnerable groups.
2. Introduction to Trauma and trauma healing.
3. Capacity building for Conflict Resolution.
4. Promoting participative Leadership and good governance.
5. Mapping local resources and developing partnerships for Development.

Centre Ubuntu

Centre Ubuntu, founded by Dominican Friars in 2002, bases its peacebuilding work on six propositions:

1. Peace emerges from the transformative change of critical mass of individuals.
2. A sense of shared belonging and dialogue can lead groups to cease their engagement in violence.
3. Media can serve to create awareness.
4. Community self-help projects can assist in uniting different groups.
5. Strengthening social capital infused with democratic concepts can foster collaboration and more effective peaceful communities.
6. Mutual dialogue and encounter can help people understand each other.

Sylvester Bongani Maphosa: 'Building Peace from Below: The Centre Ubuntu in Burundi', Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, University of Peace, Volume 2, Number 2, 2009, p. 59–60.

Concluding remarks

Centre Ubuntu socialization activities are still sporadic, haphazard and have not yet spawned that country-wide and requisite coordination to create a critical mass for tangible change at macro level to reach "peace writ large". However, small scale grassroots interventions, like working with schools, prisons, IDPs, and returnees, is having a micro peacebuilding impact at the individual, personal level and slowly but surely is moving into sociopolitical sphere. Communication, truth, respect, trust, justice, networking and collaboration are pillars upon which an enduring peace can be established in post-conflict societies like Burundi. Getting approaches creating a critical mass for tangible change at macro level to reach "peace writ large" remains the main challenge that requires coordination country-wide.

Measuring and/or evaluating success in building peace is no easy matter. There is a need to set up indicators with community members of sustainable changes in attitudes, behavior, structures, and cultural conceptions. For the Centre Ubuntu Team and our psychosocial facilitators, there is a strong need for capacity building in planning, monitoring and evaluating in contexts of complexity and uncertainty, with possibility for a scenario methodology.

FriEnt
Working Group on
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Democratic reform in Kenya

*By Cyprian Nyamwamu**

Challenges

For organizations working on constitutional change and multi party democracy the lack of learning platforms in the democracy and peacebuilding community in Kenya is a main challenge for result orientation. This has denied the efforts to build scenarios that offer clearer perspective of what the real problem is and what ought to be done.

For a long time in the quest for reforms in Kenya, the ruling class used to frame the questions. Due to this reality, the reform movement was unable to position itself as a force of good until the mid 1990s when the emergence of assertive civil society organizations gave the pro-democracy actors space to explain the need for reforms through the media and other civic education outreach activities. At the moment, the ruling elite have again stolen the agenda of reform. At the same time, pro-democracy forces fail to articulate a clear message as to how further reforms will benefit the majority of the citizens. If the message in the airwaves is that "these are stooges of the west" aimed at undermining the sovereignty of our country, there is a real problem.

Due to dependence on resources from the North for democracy and development work in the developing world, most actors do not undertake clear planning that will ensure that their work is results oriented. Most of the time, the activities being carried out are not connected to clear outputs (such as collective charters, resolutions, tools, guidelines)

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that will lead to clear outcomes (policy, legal reform) that then will lead to clear impact in terms of change of culture and governance processes.

I would like to point out a few challenges when it comes to performance: Unfortunately there is a lack of data to show what change has happened in the society over what period. Many actors are busy trying to implement activities but there are few if any initiatives aimed at collecting, collating and analyzing the data available to show what changes have occurred attributable to the work being undertaken in the area of focus. There is also a duplication of work and attribution of credit is always a challenge. At the level of implementation, there is a massive resource challenge because some governments still believe that reform and peacebuilding programmes are essentially not part of the mandate of the government but that of foreign donors and civil society actors.

Challenges that arise more particularly from donor requirements

The demand for tangible results in a political process that takes time to change has always been very frustrating. One funding agency one time asserted that constitutional reforms were taking too long to come and hence the need to engage in other development programmes that would bear results. Donor agencies are mostly not in partnership relations with agencies involved in peacebuilding work but in fact treat recipients as clients who they use to implement pre-conceived programmes and projects. It is almost on a take it or leave it basis. Although this has improved over the years some of the recipients becoming more assertive and becoming better negotiators, this challenge remains.

Response

The 4 A's Approach:

The 4 A's approach has always been instrumental in navigating the spaces of reform and peacebuilding. It entails:

- Analysis based on research to promoting evidence based engagement and action.
- Access: promoting a framework where citizens access information and rights for them to act for themselves and make informed choices.
- Advocacy: promoting advocacy that is informed by analysis and research and also supported by the majority of the people in whose name change is being advocated for (to reduce the legitimacy deficit).
- Accountability: where accountability is enforced on duty bearers as much as on citizens themselves including the change champions.

The spaces Approach

Over the past ten to eleven years, the democracy and human rights movement has come to assess impact in terms of how much we open up the closed spaces in the state system, expand the invited spaces such as various dialogue and reform commissions and forums with the government.

There is also one unique thing we have nurtured in Kenya which has always held the country together: the building of a resource of weavers — men and women who have sufficient clout to knock at the doors that matter in order to deliver messages and make a conversation possible. This approach has helped the Kenyan reform movements to deliver results that led to the promulgation of a new constitution on August 27, 2010.

The Civic Action/Movement Approach

This approach encourages a situation where every actor's work contributes to the better performance of the other actors in four vital fields of intervention: "service", "advocacy", "education and dialogue" and "institution/platform and assets building". Although undeveloped, when it has been applied, mostly at crisis points in the life of the nation, it has worked to ensure that bad situations are turned into opportunities for leveraging reforms under what sometimes is called "the constitutional moments" or the "constitutive moments" of the nation.

Recommendations: Support from donor organizations that would be helpful

1. Scenario building spaces will be very useful to enhance result orientation in programming;
2. Joint strategic planning with donors that takes the realities on the ground into account;
3. There is need for capacity building for actors on how to undertake persuasion, negotiation, dialogue and consensus building for change;
4. There is need to invest in broad and sustainable platforms for engagement of various actors where several donor agencies have a role. The lack of a national platform for reforms in Kenya in a big way explains why there are no strong alternative voices to those of politicians.

Links & Literature

Kenya Transitional Justice Network (KTJN)
National Convention Executive Council (NCEC)

CRAFOD and citizen participation in local governance: a long-term vision of change

*By Pierre Fichter**

CRAFOD (the regional development support and training centre or *Centre Régional d'Appui et de Formation pour le development* in Bas-Congo, DRC), through its "citizen participation in local governance" Section, has the primary aim of leading the population to assume ownership of its own democracy. The DRC is a young democracy which succeeded in organising its first presidential elections in 2006, after several decades marked by the dictatorship of President Mobutu. But as the Congo's recent history proves, it is not enough to implement electoral processes, boost parliamentary institutions or draw up decentralisation legislation to durably engage a truly democratic system. Nonetheless, the major donors from the "old democracies" often direct their aid towards the top, that is to say, towards governments, public services and national institutions such as the Independent Electoral Commission, the Court of Auditors, etc; some times forgetting that democracy cannot be decreed from one day to the next but is a perpetual combat emanating from grass-roots citizens through processes that take time. In other words, western democratic models cannot be implemented directly in African societies, but must be re-appropriated by the people, otherwise the "democratic" label remains a facade behind which corrupt, authoritarian systems persist as long as the citizens do not possess the means of defending their interests and asserting their rights.

* CPS-BfdW peace worker for CRAFOD from 2009 to December 2012

Working on behaviour patterns as the basis for change

Against this background, the strategy implemented by CRAFOD primarily consists in organising citizens from the perspective of durably installing a culture of grassroots democracy capable of ensuring in a long term system of governance that takes the well-being of the population into account. This work requires a focus on changes in behaviour at the different levels of intervention. The desire for change in the context of the Congo can only be achieved through the actors increasing their awareness of the individual and collective behaviour patterns that enable social and political change.

In concrete terms, the activities developed by CRAFOD are therefore aimed at accompanying groups of citizens to provide a framework for the population to defend its interests and assert its aspirations constructively. Bonds have to be re-created within the population and dialogue established between the population and the authorities. Social and community dynamics must also be created on the scale of national bodies, for if the DRC is currently a nation in a very centralised and hierarchical sense, the population groups are chiefly confronted with the authorities of their community, sector or district, and it is first of all at local level that they are subjected to the abuses and malfunctioning of the Congolese State. It is therefore also at this level that dialogue can be initiated with the political/administrative authorities.

It is in this sense that in addition to the organisational capacity building of the population and support for creating groups or associations, we are trying to encourage the creation of forums for discussion and exchange which should allow people to express themselves and keep each other informed. In this respect, it is no longer the NGOs who come and provide awareness-raising and lessons on different subjects, such as elections, for example, but the individuals themselves who reflect and exchange ideas in order to find solutions. These forums can be varied based on a number of tools: Brainstorming workshops, collectives of individuals or associations, radio programmes or local meetings.

Local meetings are used regularly by the NAPOs (*Noyaux d'Action pour la Participation Citoyenne* — or citizen participation action cells) which are groups of citizens supported by CRAFOD who strive to mobilise the population around problems in the neighbourhoods of Matadi (the administrative capital of the province of Bas-Congo) and to report these problems, along with solutions, to the authorities. These local meetings bring together small numbers of individuals in a framework enabling individual expression and reflexion. People should feel free to express their views and afterwards feel they have been useful towards changing the situation, that the situation is not inevitable and that things can also be changed "from the bottom up". The work on behaviour therefore often starts with a struggle against the waiting game the population plays with respect to the authorities or NGOs. For instance, with the NAPOs, the population of Matadi is tackling various problems in the neighbourhoods: improving living conditions, repairing roads, water and electricity supplies, struggling against insecurity but also the prevention of conflicts between communities. The authorities have today become accustomed to working with the NAPOs and regularly visiting the neighbourhoods. Social relations are therefore gradually being re-established in Matadi simultaneously as the city tries to modernise.

Empowering young people for sustainable change

The work on behaviour is therefore a part of long-term processes, and CRAFOD's approach has naturally turned over time towards the empowerment of youth. Betting on youth means building dynamics that will create emancipation in the long term; it means preparing future generations to become responsible actors committed to the social development of Africa. In this sense, CRAFOD's work with young people aims to promote youth leadership, the objective being to organise the youth groups willing to commit, to work to assert their interests and

foster the emergence of leaders capable of rallying supporters, and who will be able to play important roles in the future in the construction of their country.

This experience with young people is beginning to show results. For in fact, among the young people engaged in the associations accompanied by CRAFOD, some have become leaders at a local level.

The path of a young man such as Alpha Manséka is rather eloquent. An education science student, Alpha created a group with other young people from the Mabanga neighbourhood in the town of Mbanza Ngungu (Young people's Union for integrated development) whose prime aim is to combat anti-values and promote awareness of problem issues concerning substance abuse, AIDS and prostitution. This is where collaboration commenced with CRAFOD, which supported the group in becoming organised and in implementing awareness-raising activities. The group then invested efforts in accompanying the population during the 2011 elections. On this occasion, young Alpha distinguished himself through his dynamic personality, sense of analysis and communication and through his integrity vis-à-vis political discourse. From there, Alpha decided to become even more involved by producing radio programmes dealing with the social problems experienced by young people, and he also took the initiative, along with other young partners of CRAFOD, to create a youth collective (the Mbanzulu collective) with the aim of creating the dynamics of youth exchanges on the scale of the province of Bas-Congo. Today, this commitment and initiative have allowed Alpha Manséka to be elected by his peers to the presidency of the young people's council of the Cataractes district (one of the 3 districts that make up the province).

The involvement of the population as a measure of our impact on society

We therefore believe that to have a long-term impact in terms of change requires the deep rooting of certain values within the population, and the promotion of constructive behaviour. As we have seen, these are long processes that should be factored into the definition of intervention strategies and the formulation of approaches. Also, the impacts of the activities implemented can be measured primarily by the observed changes in behaviour within a community, or a group, at specific moments: How does the population react to a sudden change in the situation, what is its capacity to organise?

In 2011, for example, on the occasion of the presidential and legislative elections, CRAFOD implemented a programme to accompany the populations with the partners we have just mentioned (the NAPOs and youth groups) the aim of which was to lead citizens to reflect on their role, that of the election candidates and the elected representatives, on the notions of citizen responsibility and politicians' accountability, but also to prevent post-electoral violence such as was witnessed in the province following the 2006 elections. The activities were therefore developed in the form of local meetings, brainstorming workshops and radio programmes to reach the widest possible audience. This work allowed people to express themselves and develop their capacity to analyse. We also felt in Bas-Congo a certain maturity on the part of the voters and did not record any violence in the province unlike the rest of the country; above all, on the day of the vote, in the towns we worked in we were able to observe that the young people organised themselves spontaneously by setting up surveillance systems around the polling booths. These young people organised themselves outside of any political party and were able to prevent fraud attempts on the part of candidates who tried to influence the voters at the entrance to the polling stations. We also saw young people helping polling stations which were underequipped. In the end, there were no massive frauds recorded in

the province of Bas-Congo. One last example shows that the work done within the framework of an approach based on self-expression, dialogue and analysis within the community can have an impact in terms of the involvement of the population, here again we can see that young people constitute an extremely important link in the construction of democratic governance focused on the management of community interests.

During the summer of 2012, a protest movement was organised in the region of Luozi in reaction to repeated abuses, in particular on the part of the Luozi territorial administrator and certain sector leaders. This movement denounced corruption and the misappropriation of public funds, and was in fact initiated by young people who had worked with CRAFOD on several occasions, in particular during the election period, and who had succeeded in rallying young people independently of political affiliations and especially in a peaceful manner. Here again the young people were able to control their frustration and propose a constructive rebellion which led to the case being taken up by the provincial authorities and several administrators being dismissed. This movement also had an impact on the province's population, since shortly afterwards similar movements emerged in other towns, such as Mbanza Ngungu, where the population demanded the removal of a corrupt procurator.

We therefore believe that the involvement of a part of the population constitutes the first effects of our action in terms of promoting good governance, for the protest methods being implemented here are new and can gradually alter the lines. In all these examples, there is an increasing awareness on the part of the authorities of the necessity of certain changes and the population understands that it can be an agent of its own development.

This approach to participation in local governance, as we have seen, is therefore formulated out of a concern for the sustainable, so that the long–term impact can be the workings of a true democracy desired and experienced by all Congolese citizens.

The challenges of implementing a monitoring system – a consultant's perspective

*By Josephine Beck-Engelberg**

Introduction

Over the past few years, international donors have been more demanding about monitoring — particularly the monitoring of the impact of activities financed through their funds. For many of them, the question is of acquiring information enabling them to report to the public on the legitimacy of this expenditure, but also to build a database that will help to identify the most effective approaches.

As a consultant, I was convinced that impact-oriented monitoring was a good thing, as it can help project teams focus their aims, learn how their activities influence the life of the target groups and draw lessons for future interventions and project strategies. We can no longer afford to continue activities only because we are in the habit of doing so…. Orienting projects towards effects or impacts requires rigorous strategic planning, where each activity based on well-founded hypotheses (cause and effect relations) should contribute to achieving precise objectives. From now on, all concerned should know the goal they are working towards…. And, all going well, they receive regular information on the progress towards goals, on successes and failures.

After multiple consultations with different NGOs in Africa, my observation is that despite the fact that projects are based on a planning

* Organisational development consultant in francophone Africa

document comprising goals that are sometimes even very precise (with indicators), once funding has been acquired, these documents are quickly put aside. Through time and the multiple daily activities, the goals or even less the indicators are no longer systematically taken into account. Rare are the NGO projects that have a monitoring mechanism that goes beyond monitoring activities. The project team often falls into a sort of trap of being extremely active, with the concern of being able to realise the maximum amount of activities in a short time. When the time comes for evaluation we remember the objectives and try to justify the different activities implemented without being able to say whether they led to a change in the situation of the target groups or to what extent the project goals have been met. At the same time, this way of working prevents the strategic adaptations that are sometimes necessary while the project is ongoing.

I was therefore convinced that the constraint of carrying out impact-oriented monitoring, even though it is imposed by the donors, is an opportunity for the NGOs, insofar as it may help to change our outlook, to cast off the "over-active" attitude and concentrate more on the effects/impacts of the work, learn to observe carefully, communicate with the target groups on achievements and difficulties and become more flexible in approach and strategy.

The implementation of a monitoring system – the case of the PJCC

The Youth, Culture and Citizenship project (French acronym PJCC) has been implemented since 2008 by Zenü Network (a network of civil society organisations) with the financial support of the Bread for the World. Generally speaking, the PJCC encourages personal development of young people in western Cameroon by promoting constructive citizenship that valorises participatory democracy, reduces corruption in schools and supports youth employment.

Within the framework of support to the PJCC, with the aim of reinforcing its organisational and operational intervention strategy, among other subjects, I have had the opportunity of facilitating the implementation of an impact-oriented monitoring system since February 2012.

Developing a good intervention strategy requires clear objectives and knowledge of the landscape of the players concerned by the project. This is why these two subjects feature as the starting points for the support process. Already during the first discussion workshop with the PJCC project team it emerged that the project goals enshrined in the project document were more "outputs" in so far as they described the services rendered by the project rather than the changes sought in the living conditions of the target groups. Also, the logic between the different levels of goals (global, project, intermediary) was not sufficiently established to serve as a foundation for a good intervention strategy. This observation does not mean that the team did not know what it was working for. On the contrary, certain members had a vision that was very clear, but not sufficiently documented to allow the development of an intervention strategy, a concerted action on the part of the team and monitoring oriented towards this vision.

Thus, we began our work by *revising and reformulating the goals*. We then had to define good success indicators for each goal. It is this work of formulating the indicators which — according to my observation as a consultant — always represents a critical moment in the planning of a project. Even more so than the goal, formulating the indicators obliges us to say precisely which observable change we are aiming for, in terms of both quality and quantity. The visionaries in the project team are asked to come down to earth and identify what is to be given priority and is feasible in a given period and what is not.

I used a power point presentation to introduce the participants to the art of developing *impact indicators*. Up until then, the indicators used by the PJCC were mainly project activity indicators (e.g. the number of youths strengthened, number of focal points created, etc.) Then we conducted practical exercises in formulating the indicators for the

different goals. In fact, the question of indicators provoked a lot of discussion among the team members before they agreed to a joint formulation. The difficulty was not formulating the indicator per se, but choosing the right indicators to show a goal has been reached. To monitor the reduction in school corruption, for example, the team finally decided it was necessary to observe not only the frequency of denunciations by type of act, but also the changes in the parents' level of commitment to citizen control and in the level of recognition of the bodies for combating corruption. Parents and pupils willing to testify that corruption had decreased were also required.

The time spent in workshops was not enough to complete this work for all the project goals. We therefore agreed that the project coordinators would continue to define the indicators and if difficulties were to arise, I made myself available to answer any questions.

Until my second visit — four months later — I heard nothing from the PJCC…. A meeting with the coordinators revealed that the work on the indicators had not continued as agreed. However, the team was very busy with the different project activities (especially related to implementing a mechanism to fight school corruption) which could not be postponed. Although this priority given to implementing concrete activities is perfectly understandable, in a way it confirmed my concern that the formulating and implementation of a monitoring system is not perceived as a prerequisite to action but rather as an add-on or even a luxury. Another hypothesis is that formulating impact indicators requires a certain amount of "mental gymnastics" which the partners have not yet sufficiently mastered to be able to exercise it without facilitation/outside support.

During the second workshop with the PJCC, instead of launching straight into completing the formulation of the indicators, I first of all led the team to visualise the *chain of causality*[1] for one of the project goals (combating school corruption) which has a quite complex inter-

1 The chain of causality is a chain of hypotheses about cause and effect relations.

vention strategy. The team were asked to imagine the path between the starting situation and the target situation, making the distinction between the direct effects and indirect effects of project intervention. My role was to guide the members through this process, continually calling into question the logic of cause and effect, as well as the probability of the target effects. In the end, with much concentration, this chain was built and completed. The visualisation facilitated the verification of the consistency and integrality of the intervention strategy. Also, not only the different landmarks of project intervention, but also the contributions of other players necessary for reaching the goal were identified.

On the basis of this chain of causality, the participants were easily able to more precisely formulate the goal and its indicators. At the same time, the chain of effects helped to identify key project activities.

The feedback from different participants during the workshop was very positive. For some people, the development of the chain of causality was important because it clarified the logic and the complexity of the intervention strategy; for others it was a relief to have an easily understandable global framework to help plan project activities. Especially in the case of the PJCC, which is a project implemented by staff from different civil society organisations; this framework constitutes an important reference point for joint, harmonised action.

Although apparently useful, I am once more wondering if the formulation of a chain of causality has now been mastered and used by PJCC personnel — an indispensable condition to ensure the sustainability of the achievement.

Once the intervention strategy, goals and impact indicators have been effectively formulated, the last stage remaining in the implementation of the monitoring system is the *formulation of a monitoring plan and the devising of monitoring tools*. For each indicator, the monitoring plan shows who collects which information with which tool and when. It also shows how this information will be documented, analysed and reported. According to my observation, this work was quickly under-

stood by the PJCC team. Formulating the monitoring tools was the most difficult. Here, it is important to achieve a good mix of quality and quantity measurements, while at the same time making sure the project is not weighed down with too many monitoring tasks. One of the main challenges of our work was to formulate the quality tools to generate the data serving several indicators. In the end, we had 16 monitoring tools and 19 information items to follow.

At this point, the theoretical part of the monitoring system implementation and my support to the team came to an end. Now, the practical application will show how useful the tool is for project steering. In this stage of implementation it is critical for the PJCC project team to try to apply the tools as specified in the monitoring plan, to amend these tools when necessary, to document and interpret the information collected and to draw lessons for the future intervention strategy. One concern remains: Will the PJCC team have the necessary determination and capacity to accomplish these tasks?

Conclusions and final considerations

There are several good reasons for local development organisations (NGOs, civil society organisations) to set up a monitoring system.

Already well before it is applied, a result oriented monitoring system can be useful in helping the project teams or staff from the organisations share their knowledge and define intervention strategy. In addition, in a complex situation, the monitoring system helps to focus on certain well-defined parameters to measure the effects of a project. The choice of these parameters is quite subjective and can vary from one project to another, even if the goals are the same. The monitoring system requires the definition of the contours of the reality where the changes will be observed and reporting and checking the impact hypotheses (the cause and effect relations) which are the basis for the development actions. Finally, the system can generate information on

positive effects that can motivate the continued efforts of the project teams.

However, there are also many challenges involved in setting up a monitoring system. It is not by chance that many projects do not have an operational monitoring system.

The first major challenge is the fact that formulating and implementing the monitoring system requires the determination of the staff of a project or organisation to regularly question the effectiveness and well-founded nature of its work. Development organisations who perceive their work as a service provision providing staff with a steady income will certainly be less willing to do this.

The second challenge is mastering the technique for formulating, implementing and adjusting a monitoring system. This work requires a mindset oriented towards cause and effect relations, systematic rigour and a good capacity to guide team reflections.

The third challenge is the availability of the project team in terms of time and effort. Formulating and implementing the monitoring system is often perceived as work that is additional to the usual work. Formulating the system already requires particularly strong determination, and even more so it's systematic application, interpretation of results and the use of these results for better project steering.

With respect to experiences with many other NGOs and local development partners in Africa, I have some even more general questions in mind. Does the development and application of an impact-oriented monitoring system represent a real need as perceived by the partners? Is the logic of thinking and explanation based on predictable or more or less probable/plausible cause and effect perhaps too technocratic, insofar as it seeks to meet only technical and administrative needs? Wouldn't this mean therefore that we are trying to impose a way of thinking that does not correspond to the way our partners perceive and explain the changes in their reality, which is more holistic, and therefore based rather on the conviction that each phenomenon is the product of multiple interactions? If this is the case, they will perhaps do

everything to meet the monitoring requirements expressed by the donors, without really taking the approach onboard (adapting it, living it, defending it, etc.). And me, as a consultant, what role do I play in this context? The long arm of the donors? — a role I never expected nor wanted to find myself in…!

Project impact monitoring and the challenges of cooperation: The case of the PJCC, the point of view of a partner in the field

*By Flaubert Djateng**

In 2008, young people in Cameroon took to the streets, breaking what they found and setting fire to everything. What started out as a protest on the part of transport workers regarding the increased price of fuel turned into a channel for young people to express their anger and frustration. They used the street as a place for expressing their discontent. An analysis by civil society in the region of West Cameroon highlighted the necessity of doing something. Zenü Network decided to take action, and from this initiative the project for Youth, Culture and Citizenship (PJCC) emerged.

At the beginning, we were convinced that we had to offer young people places where they could speak, where they could communicate with the other players in society. This was a time when Cameroon was fully involved in designing tools for implementing the decentralisation process. This was an ideal opportunity for us to facilitate analyses and nourish decision-making on a local level. It was also an opportunity to bring the decision-makers and young people closer, to foster a better knowledge of public policies, control of the decision-making processes and to defuse the discontent that leads to vandalism. The PJCC saw itself as a useful "instrument" for offering communication alternatives

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between young people and decision-makers. A project that facilitates political dialogue and advocacy to provide young people with answers to their questions. In a word, a project that contributes to the construction of the citizens of the 21st century. Isn't being a citizen recognising that we have rights, duties and powers in relation to those who have the responsibility of offering us services? Citizenship also allows us to distinguish between the goods and services that concern the community and private, personal goods. Among the services that concern the community as a whole, there are basic utilities such as water, electricity, sanitation, transport, waste disposal and cleanliness. Other services such as health, education, food, accommodation and even culture are also fundamental for the quality of life in society. Citizens are entitled to all these services and have the duty to contribute to and demand quality services. They have the power to support the development of their community. It is by fighting for our rights that we also fight against social inequalities and exclusion. For a long time, young people have been passive and have never been able to realise that they had these types of rights and powers.

We knew from the beginning that we had to put culture, our culture, at the centre of our mission. We thought we would make culture the development engine of Cameroon's youth. We take an interest in how our *chefferies* work, the role played by the elders, the values of our society, the changes and influences these values are subjected to and how there are expressed today. We are of the opinion that culture should allow us to bring together our skills and knowledge to participate in improving the quality of our actions; culture as a vehicle for collective assembly that increases the feeling of belonging to a community, the expression of citizenship, culture as a space where success and good practices are promoted, as an instrument for acknowledging work well done and preserving the common good.

We thought that we had to approach the question of youth in a holistic manner, incorporating all the players present and all the useful factors. We agreed to work first of all in the region of the West and later

add other players working along the same lines and sharing the same vision, to reach the whole country. Even working for the whole region of Western Cameroon was a challenge for us and in relation to the results we wanted to achieve. At the time there were 18 civil society organisations among us, all based in the West. We called ourselves a "network", aware that this form of organisation requires answers to certain questions in order to be operational. How would we organise ourselves? How would we manage our communication in such a way as to make it effective? How would we distribute the roles in order to keep power struggles and rivalry among us at a minimum? How could we ensure better representation of our interests and a better defence of the interests of young people? How could we actively involve young people?

And, the big question, where would we find the money to finance this work? Initially, the members of our network volunteered to provide the work sessions for analysis, research and logistics necessary to move forward. But voluntary work has its limits in a context of increasing poverty, and money has to be found eventually. Looking for funding made our mission more complex, for not only did we have to develop a work strategy, but we also had to develop another strategy specifically for attracting the money that finances our work.

Our contact with a donor in Europe was a useful opportunity at this precise moment. For the desk officer we dealt with showed flexibility and a capacity to dialogue on the contents that enabled us to reflect on our work from a long term perspective with useful stages that would allow us to develop a strategy to cope with the complexity of accompanying young people in Cameroon. That is why we decided that it would be useful first of all to start working and then to examine the work we had done after 2 years from the rationale of assisted self-assessment to refocus our priorities depending on the progress we had made. This key moment within the framework of our mission was to enable us to choose our orientations following our objectives, to develop approaches and then define indicators that would be useful for the remainder of project steering and for feedback on the changes we were influencing.

Then the desk officer changed at one of the funding agencies. This change caused a disruption in the management of the PJCC. We found ourselves with a new challenge: Faced with a person who was new and not familar with the kind of interaction we were used to have with colleagues and partners in Europe, we had to argue, convince and persuade that the work with young people in Cameroon constitutes one of the useful leverage points for social transformation. Then argue that involving civil society is a new orientation that makes it possible to row against the current of growing apathy in Cameroonian society with an attitude summarised by "anyhow what can we do?" It expresses the resignation and discouragement of the population who are overwhelmed by a difficult situation.

Now, as soon as there is no basic agreement between donor and partner in the field on common goals, when the dialogue and negotiations between them are concentrated on form not substance, there is a danger that threatens: The power of money invades the space of negotiation and discussion of the useful factors that should accompany a development action. All the instruments are oriented towards and concern, in the first instance, money. Money is at the heart of everything: The sheets, forms, software, reporting systems. Money governs the relations between the stakeholders, before, during and after. Obviously we are accountable for the funds we use and should make our use of them transparent and visible. But the main thing is precisely what changes can be induced with these material means and the human resources at our disposal. However, when money is at the heart of the mechanism and the content is submerged by it, meetings and exchanges are tinged with questions of finance, sometimes mixed with feelings of fear and envy. Situations that engender attitudes and behaviour far from the social transformation we are seeking to foster. But shouldn't the desired impacts be as much in the interests of the donors as the partners in the field? Shouldn't both feel jointly responsible for succeeding and overcoming the obstacles and blockages?

In our case there was a showdown and our feathers got ruffled but

we finally got the green light from the donor for funding the youth work in Western Cameroon. At that stage, we felt obliged to agree to the reformulation of goals and indicators imposed by the desk officer in charge at the level of the donor. Aware that we needed a strategy, we added the backstopping by an external consultant to the budget lines. We had a twin priority, to have money to continue the work and to have the advantage of a qualified person to help devise a real strategy subsequently.

Our assisted self-evaluation allowed us to choose the fight against corruption as a means to promote citizenship in schools and information/communication/training about employment as a contribution to youth employment issues. We are entering phase 2 of the PJCC with great expectations. Not only do we hope to take full advantage of the consultant/backstopper who has agreed to accompany us, but also of the 3 year period to improve our organisation and avoid depending on a single funding agency. We still have challenges to meet, for this phase comes at a time when there are structural changes at our donor's which we are a little anxious about given our past experience. However, we have decided to see this change as an opportunity. This could be a chance for us to make ourselves understood. It may be the moment to reduce or even eliminate misunderstandings, and convey our vision of youth work within the system of the new structure. We are convinced that development in Africa will be achieved by working with the most available, abundant resource: human resources, African youth. The quality of the services for young people, the vitality and self-development of these young people, their participation in the development of the countries and of the continent, their integration into an increasingly global world constitutes the impact of our work.

Strategic backstopping is not simply an opportunity to define our work strategy, it is also an opportunity to create a basis for useful collaboration between ourselves and our partners to bring about real change in the lives of young Cameroonians.

To cover the whole region of Western Cameroon, we became an

organisation with multiple players, with decision and action centres at different levels, horizontal and vertical. How the network would operate was the first test of skill for the consultant. The question was how to reconcile the definition of an intervention rationale that takes into account multiple layers of decision-making and monitoring? Next was the fact that our commitment on the ground did not give us the necessary latitude for hindsight, leaving the impression of a lack of interest in everything concerning strategy.

The consultant's tenacity made it possible to develop a monitoring system based on our reality, define an intervention rationale based on our vision and expectations, identify the indicators that track not only what we have done but also the progress of our endeavours to enhance the credibility and quality of our youth services.

The new monitoring system is not only useful for monitoring our activities, but also serves as a tool for assessing the commitment of the members of the network. It has led us to question ourselves and address our commitment to the endeavour. However, it does not take into account the level of resources available for the work. At the beginning, we did not have any money, the donor made resources available to us that allowed us to do useful things, self-evaluation showed us the progress made and pointed out our weakness, the lack of systemisation of our results.

The current systemisation of the work leaves no ambiguity and highlights the quality of the work and the level of the efforts invested. Current financing does not allow for the administrative and operating costs of the focal points in charge of monitoring the activities in the *départements*. The bimonthly monitoring meetings have become critical times in relation to the work done and a certain amount of despondency is perceptible among the members of the network involved in the PJCC.

At the level of the funding agency's new structure, the work of strategic backstopping has been highly appreciated, but the constraints of managing relations with the Ministry of cooperation (the funders of

the funding agency) have meant that the results of the backstopping were not immediately integrated into the current project implementation system. They shall be taken into account from the end of this phase onwards.

The case of the PJCC questions the foundations of partnership when it is necessary to show the impact of the actions conducted in development cooperation. What are the partner's commitments in the endeavours of the development organisations? How do you ensure the funding agency's accountability with respect to the social transformation to be brought about in the countries in the Southern hemisphere? What is the importance of resources in decision-making when changes have to be shown? What are the alliances to be sought and how should roles be distributed when working on a strategic issue such as the accompaniment of young people?

Bafoussam, March 2013

Assessing the interactive impact between project and context: an instrument developed by EIRENE-Sahel and partners

*By Issaka Sy M. Tahirou**

The Sahel in Africa, particularly Niger, constitutes an area where natural resources are gradually being depleted, rendering their use increasingly conflictual. Added to this phenomenon is the advent of democracy and decentralisation which implies not only a redefining of roles and responsibilities but also, and especially, the sharing of power among a number of stake-holders. The promoters of development projects are not indifferent to this situation, as they have always considered natural resource management and supporting the decentralisation process as strategic priorities in their interventions.

In 2002, EIRENE-Sahel initiated a project called "GENOVICO", within the scope of the civil peace service, to make a contribution to crisis prevention and non violent conflict management. Very soon, the role of development projects in the dynamics of conflicts in the rural world was made a prominent theme in the GENOVICO project, in order to identify relevant arguments to support the partners. 17 projects/development programmes in Niger were studied[1] and the results showed a significant link between the dynamics of the conflicts and the

1 EIRENE Niger/Karkara, LES PROJETS ET LES CONFLITS LIES A LA GESTION DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES EN MILIEU RURAL NIGERIEN, Oct. 2002.

* Tahirou Sy is the EIRENE Great Lakes coordinator. From 2008 to 2013 he was a peace worker at EIRENE/GENOVICO Sahel in Mali and Burkina Faso



projects. The study identifies a significant influence between the projects and the context, in particular related to the creation of new resources and/or social dynamics and the unconstructive way the project promoters perceived the conflict situations. The benefits of designing tools and instruments therefore became obvious.

To meet this need, in 2005 EIRENE and its collaborators in Niger initiated work to design an instrument called "Assessing the interactive impact between project and context (EIIPC)". The process comprising documentary research and workshop forums led to an approach defined in six stages described in the diagram above.

Each stage comprises a set of tools for gathering and processing the data required to improve the results achieved in line with expectations.

The "EIIPC" tool was forwarded to EIRENE's partners through the GENOVICO programme for a wide application (test) to obtain items

useful for its evaluation. Several practical cases at the level of EIRENE projects emerged in Niger and one case in Mali. The table opposite shows eight (8) examples of use that served for an evaluation, the major results of which were:

Strengths: Helps to indicate new tracks for finding a solution and adapts to suit each stage of the project; **Weaknesses:** Use requires good skills in the use of conflict analysis tools and there are difficulties in appropriating the process on the part of the project initiators.

One of the remarkable experiences of the implementation of the instrument was the one EIRENE conducted in partnership with the NGO ORFED in Mali around the project called "Commitment for promotion of female candidates in the municipal elections of 26 March 2009 in 43 municipalities in Sikasso Cercle in Mali". This is a project

Partners	Kind of application
PADET/EIRENE Project – Niger	Support for a training process and application to practical cases in favour of the project's local partners.
AGSA/EIRENE	Application to the cases of cereal banks set up by the project
NGO AID Kookari/EIRENE	Planning phase of Bella pastoral well project conducted within the scope of the ASAD programme
PAPEC/EIRENE	Analysis to achieve more conflict-sensitive planning of the PAPEC project
EIRENE, PPLM and DKH	Integration as part of a study of the juncture between development aid and emergency food security aid in the Sahel
PADET/EIRENE	Integration as part of the external evaluation of the 1st phase of the PADET project
NGO ADA	Conflict-sensitive planning of a project for stocking Tanda pond with fish with the help of the EIIPC instrument
NGO ORFED/Mali	Evaluation of a project for the promotion of female candidates for municipal elections in the municipality of Sikasso (Laydu)

lasting 9 months, the actions of which are divided between the pre-election period (November 08 – March 09) and the post-election period (April 09 – August 09).

The application of EIIPC made it possible to identify potential in terms of conflict factors and peace factors, with precise recommendations aimed at the NGO ORFED.

One example of the results capitalised on is situated at the level of a "conflict-sensitive" analysis of activities that were planned and not carried out. This analysis allowed the project agents to review their implementation strategies for each activity from the angle of "potential to generate conflict". The table below gives an excerpt from the activities analysed, with proposed amendments.

The EIIPC instrument has proven to be quite flexible in application thanks to the tools that can be applied at each stage in the project cycle. Its use by the partners of EIRENE not only provided comparative elements to improve intervention strategies but also enabled contact between the players of several collaborative projects.

The Layidu project

The project is implemented by the Organisation for Reflection, Training for Democracy (ORFED) financed by the Canadian Cooperation organisation (CECI). The changes hoped for can be summed up as a wide participation of women in the electoral process and a significant increase in the proportion of women elected in Sikasso Cercle.

The key players (direct target group) of the project are the political parties, women's associations, potential (female) candidates and the political, administrative and traditional authorities.

The lines of intervention of the project are capacity building for women in political action and lobbying towards political parties and the authorities in favour of female candidates.

Proposed options for Peace culture

Analysis of activities (likely to generate conflict)		**Proposed improvement and positive effects desired**		
Activities	**Remarks**	**Actions**	**Effects on conflict factors**	**Effects on Peace factors**
Development of adverts	This activity was planned in the form of radio adverts and posters with no prior study of the susceptibilities of the players, in particular social influence.	Take local sensitivities into account, such as religious and traditional leaders and men (husbands) and young men in the content of adverts	◆ Traditional conception of the position of women (diminished) ◆ Awareness and recognition of women's capacity in public life	◆ Participation of women in public life (boosted) ◆ Registration of women on voters lists
Official ceremony to hand over certificates to Political Parties	The "Layidu" project plans to hand over the certificates just after the results are announced. The Department for the Promotion of Women, Children and the Family is not involved in the project.	◆ Distinction between Political Parties by the Department for the Promotion of Women, Children and the Family ◆ Plan to have a summary table of the results of the Political Parties	◆ Reduced rivalry among women within the Political Parties ◆ The distinction between the Political Parties will incite women to do better within the Political Parties	◆ The quota system taken into account within the Political Parties ◆ The distinction of parties with more women on their lists of candidates will be an example that others can follow
Training workshop for women leaders, potential candidates	This training is only for the women proposed by the political parties. Women elected representatives from the Sikasso region are not involved	◆ Involve the women elected representatives from the region ◆ Review the number of participants (more women)	◆ Reduced rivalry among the women within the Political Parties ◆ Give several women the opportunity to participate	◆ Allows good participation of women in political life ◆ Awareness raising of women on the stakes and how politics works

It is important now to move to a review meeting to study the results of all the test applications in detail and propose a user's guide accessible to all the people working in development.

This experience shows that it is as important as it is necessary to work from the principle of adapting various concepts, instruments and tools to the different work contexts. The effectiveness of an intervention can be improved not only by a combination of concepts but also by adapting them.

Advocacy for change

Experience in the mining area of Likasi, DRC

*By Deogratias Ilunga Yolola**
*and Ulli von Baggehufwudt*** *(SADRI)*

What do we want to change?

At the beginning of 2011, our partners from consultative group the "Mungazi" *Cadre de Concertation Zonale* (CCZ) approached us concerning growing rumours in the town of Likasi: acts of sexual violence were supposedly becoming increasingly frequent in the area, especially in the mining sites.

Town of Likasi

With an estimated population of approximately 447,449 in 2012, Likasi (formerly Jadotville), situated 120 Km from Lubumbashi, is a town in the Province of Katanga in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Likasi lies in the heart of the mining region of Katanga, in the vicinity of the mountains of Mitumba and Kundelungu. Called the "town of light", Likasi (the name of which comes from dikashi, "sweet fragrances") is one of the tourist towns of the Congo-Kinshasa area.

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A mining centre and important communication hub, the inhabitants (Kaondés and Sanga) were called "Copper eaters". They used clay ovens and antilope skin bellows to melt crushed malachite, extract the copper from it and shape it. The motto is *Aere laboreque*, (through copper and work). The town has a well-endowed mineralogy museum with a collection of 600 samples of rock.

With the support of SADRI, the CCZ carried out research to ascertain whether these were unfounded rumours or if the phenomenon posed real problems in the area. The results of the research were presented, discussed and approved at a workshop attended by several of the players concerned, in particular the political and administrative authorities, legal experts, doctors, diggers and civil society. The players present at the time confirmed the existence of "Firms" of traditional practitioners operating in the mining quarries, which are very frequently visited by diggers seeking a rise in the profitability of their pits for extracting minerals. The traditional practitioners were advising the diggers, in return for payment, to "practice human sacrifice" by means of raping young girls (virgins) and collecting their blood. The blood collected in this way was supposed to have "magic powers" and was poured directly into the pit to increase the yield of the products of the mine. In this way, a sort of "rape permit" was instituted!

In the quarries around Likasi and Kambove, the ideal victims are often children (boys and girls) who clean the minerals or engage in trade to earn a little money to pay for school fees or even for the subsistence of their families. Also, it should be noted that the quarries exploited by artisan miners generally have a lower mineral content compared to industrial mining sites. With no choice and "forced" to give fate a hand, artisan miners have turned to the traditional practitioners.

Cadre de Concertation Mungazi (CCZ)

The CCZ/Mungazi is a multiple-player learning group capable of analysing system malfunctions, and of engaging and involving a variety of different stake holders (from the State, businesses, development partners, civil society organisations and population groups). It emerged within the framework of the project: "contributing to improving the governance of the mining resources in Katanga" implemented by SADRI in partnership with the *Alliance pour Refonder la Gouvernance en Afrique* (ARGA). The aim of this project was to help improve economic, social and political governance in the mining sector, in particular by establishing cooperation systems, by building more equitable management policies for the mining sector which provide more development for indigenous communities, are more respectful of the environment and which reflect the diversity of groups and interests, as well as the implementation of strategies for advocacy towards the stakeholders in governance in the mining sector.

Association Faiseurs de Paix (AFP)

Founded in 2002 after a workshop on peaceful conflict resolution organised by SADRI, the *Association des Faiseurs de Paix* is well-known in the town of Likasi thanks to its expertise in mediation and conflict management. One of the major successes of the AFP is the transformation of an old municipal market that was once the theatre for fighting between the Katangais and Kasaïens in 1991/1992 into a "peace market" (AMANI market).

In the partnership between the two organisations, AFP's expertise in peace work and conflict resolution is complementary to CCZ's multiple-player approach.

How we worked

In the feedback workshop, several tracks for action were proposed and a Work Cell was set up to review the feasibility of these actions. Advocacy seemed to be the most efficient and affordable method, given the context, the players and the resources.

A sentence from a previous edition of "Building Peace" *Advocacy for Change* (Civil Peace Service/EED) summarises what we mean by "advocacy": "advocacy is a commitment on the part of civil society players to trigger a positive change process in favour of a given social group" (ibid p. 9).

Naturally, we can work towards such a change using different methods. As there is already a whole publication on the subject, we shall not go into detail here.[1]

Discussing the various approaches to advocacy, the members of the Cell agreed that it would be ideal to conduct advocacy *with* the girls and families concerned instead of simply speaking out *on their behalf*. But, given the sensitive nature of the subject, we agreed that even if the families do not want to be in the spotlight, they should be consulted as part of the advocacy procedure.

The Cell developed a number of strategies:

- Advocacy on the presence of children in the mines aimed at the political-administrative authorities
- Working with the traditional practitioners for the validation of our assumptions and to effect change
- Broadened awareness-raising campaign

1 To find out more about advocacy see: Building Peace: *Advocacy for Change*: Mobilisation for Peace (Civil Peace Service/EED). www.peaceworkafrica.net

Strategy and initial results:

In the initial study, several key players had already been identified, in particular the children in the mines, diggers, the traditional practitioners and fetishist-healers.

It should be said that during the Work Cell discussions, several projects of actions initially envisaged were abandoned, not because they were not good, but rather because the Cell considered that as local players, we did not have the legitimacy, the necessary resources or the capacity to carry out these actions. These were, in particular (i) to train and support legal players, (ii) accompany the medical services, (iii) incorporate awareness raising on sexual violence into the "education for life" school cycle. It was considered that to have a real impact on these sectors, we would require more resources — especially financial — which largely exceeded our capacities. We were faced with a challenge: do better with less. And the solution amounted to making much more use of the expertise and contacts we could draw on locally:

- **Advocacy towards the political-administrative authorities**
  Once again, for the advocacy towards the political-administrative authorities, the reputation of CCZ and AFP were an asset. As both the CCZ and the AFP have some of the town's civil servants among their members, it was easy to put the Advocacy Cell in contact with the key people in this domain.
  As the subject was sensitive for everyone concerned, the Division for gender, the family and children also became involved. In this way, an urban decree prohibiting the presence of children in the mines was issued and signed by the Mayor of the town.

- **Work with the traditional practitioners**
  The research-action revealed the important role played by the traditional practitioners and fetishist-healers in the phenomenon of sexual violence in the milieu, and we also discussed the possibility of

using them as "levers for change" as part of advocacy. Arriving with a "moralising" attitude was out of the question. It was also important that this message of awareness-raising/communication for change should come from those very diggers who are the ones to seek advice from the traditional practitioners, to lend it a little more legitimacy. First of all, we had to seek out contact people and meet them. We very quickly realised that there are all sorts of traditional practitioners: those who did not have a lot to say, those who were not really willing to cooperate and those who were sincere and showed a real interest in demonstrating the credibility of their "occupation".

First of all, we organised another workshop to bring together traditional practitioners, diggers and the political-administrative authorities at Likasi (see article on this subject[2]). This workshop served as a gateway to continuing the work with the traditional practitioners. The advocacy cell maintains regular contact and some traditional practitioners have even joined the Cell. The association of traditional practitioners has even formally condemned the practice of recommending the use of human blood.

- **Awareness-raising of the stake-holders**

  The members of the Cell went into the mining sites to raise the awareness of the people there: during the "morning message" meetings organised by the cooperatives before people go down the mine. The awareness-raising consisted of a short message: "*You are here to try to earn something through your labour. It is true that these mines you have been assigned have a naturally low mineral content but there are ways of increasing the mineral content other than purifying the mine using human blood from a young virgin girl or a menopausal woman. And these other practices, we (the traditional practitioners) can tell you about them.*" Hearing these words from the mouths of the traditional practitioners "demystified" the practice and discredited

2 See text in inset at the end of this document.

it. The women living in makeshift camps in the quarries were also informed about the risks of sending their children into the mines and about the urban decree whose application we are monitoring.

During the workshop with the diggers and the traditional practitioners, another need was identified: the diggers do not earn enough from their daily labour. This is part of the reason why they have recourse to the use of the traditional practitioners to increase their income. Then the advocacy group — through contacts in the cooperatives and enterprises — also developed another strand of advocacy related to the first: **Advocacy for a new price scale.** At the Kawama mine, a new price scale was published in September 2012.

Facilities/difficulties encountered:

In the approach, we encountered several difficulties:

- Working for change with a moving target population:
  In our awareness raising on sexual violence, we saw that at least a quarter of the participants at the first session were no longer there for different reasons and that another group had just arrived. How can we have an impact on a moving target group? We had to involve the newcomers without losing the interest of the longer term members of the group.

- The situation of the diggers, who sometimes work in conditions that are not only dangerous but also illegal (without permits, sometimes in industrial concessions), posed an enormous challenge: How to work with these diggers to achieve long term change? Is there any point in working for a very specific change if we cannot change the overall insecurity the players find themselves in?

- Commencing the work with the traditional practitioners was a new experience. First we had to establish a number of contacts to find people who were really interested in working with us and who did not think we had simply come to "destroy their trade". Distinguishing the *real* traditional practitioners from the "charlatans". We also had to get used to some unusual situations, for example during one meeting, a traditional practitioner who was superstitious kept having to leave the room to "consult the ancestors"!

- Groups with such a diversified membership as AFP and CCZ can serve as a gateway into various milieus (in the political-administrative domain, among industrialists, etc.).

Lessons learnt

For advocacy to be successful, there are certain lessons to be noted:

- Find some *allies*: To be successful in the field of advocacy requires influential allies. A partner like the CCZ or AFP, who have members from all walks of life, can serve as a calling card for many activities. But also for finding new allies, such as the traditional practitioners. The first approach consists in meeting several players from a domain to work out who could serve as a reliable, committed ally. A strong commitment is necessary.

- *Approach* "with" the people concerned: Depending on the subject of the advocacy, it may be difficult to work with the people concerned. Regarding the instances of sexual violence, the girls and their families did not want to be seen in public and *this should be respected*. Nonetheless, they did help in the initial research (in complete anonymity).

- The *real needs* of the population can often be one of the reasons behind a phenomenon we are trying to combat. Here, the children are often on the mining sites not for fun but to help their families survive financially. The diggers were unable to earn a living because of the price scale which was not in their favour. Simply banning children from the mines will not change the fundamental problem. To have a real, positive impact, in this case, required other, complementary activities, in particular advocacy for a new price scale.

- Advocacy is an *open process*. As in our experience at Likasi, during the work, several problems can emerge that are the basis of a phenomenon. Then, throughout the process, it is necessary to keep an open mind and not to think along one line only for finding a solution. (In our work, we have found that it is not enough to approach the authorities only, but also the traditional practitioners and the industrialists, which led us to the awareness raising campaign and advocacy for a new price scale…)

- The advocacy *process* can be *long* and it has to be followed through to the end if we want to achieve significant change. Up till now, the Cell has already obtained good results but now it is a question of following them up, to see whether the urban decree is applied, whether the traditional practitioners and fetishist-healers keep their word and stop recommending the use of human blood and then we must also verify whether the rate of sexual violence in the area has actually declined.

Natural resources, fetishist-healers and blood

The people taking part in the workshop on sexual violence in the Likasi mining area

It is often said that sexual violence is used as a weapon of war in the Congo. But in Katanga, a province that has been relatively peaceful for a number of years, sexual violence in the mines and quarries often has a quite different motivation.

As in other regions of the world, in the Congo there is a belief that blood possesses a certain power — and, of course, particularly the blood of a young virgin.

The SADRI (*Service d'Appui au Développement Régional Intégré*, or Support service for integrated regional development), works in the mining area around Likasi with local civil society groups devoted to a variety of problem issues related to copper and cobalt mining (particularly within the CCZ consultative group (Cadre de Concertation Zonal Mungazi), and the advocates of peaceful conflict resolution AFP *(Association des Faiseurs de Paix)*).

A cell of members from CCZ and AFP focuses on the phenomenon of sexual violence against children. Cases of sexual violence are increasing significantly in the mines, quarries and the surrounding area. With the support of SADRI, they conducted a study to find out and try to understand the motivations behind these acts of violence.

Among the various reasons expressed, the most striking in its quantitative and qualitative importance was the following: to increase the mineral content in a mine, the artisanal diggers often seek out the help of the traditional practitioners, sometimes called fetishist-healers. These *fetishist-healers* repeatedly tell them that the blood of a virgin increases the mineral yield of the mine. This is often the excuse put forward to justify the rape of children.

During the joint work of CCZ, AFP and SADRI several tracks for action were identified to help put a stop to the violence. The first success recorded was the signature, by the Mayor of Likasi, of an urban decree prohibiting the access of children to the mines and the bars surrounding them, the aim being to make access to the sites more difficult for potential victims, and thereby reduce the incidence of acts of sexual violence. The forthcoming evaluation shall determine the extent to which the aim has been met.

To go into the study in more depth and incorporate a few key players in the process, the organisations concerned planned a workshop and invited the traditional practitioners, diggers and local authorities (ministries of gender, the family and children, and social affairs).

In the preparation, establishing contact with the traditional practitioners was critical. We met with them individually to instil an atmosphere of trust. They all confirmed that the traditional methods were used in mining to increase the yield of a pit. Some of them gave us detailed information about the use of wild plants, which, when used during special ceremonies, could be beneficial in this sense.

On the other hand, the traditional practitioners all said the same thing about the use of the powers of blood: They affirm that blood has no special powers and seem surprised to learn that acts of sexual violence are committed in the mines for this reason.

Furthermore, all those we spoke to willingly agreed to take part in our workshop the next day.

The different interviews with the traditional practitioners therefore led the group of enquirers to call into question their initial opinions. We wondered whether we were on the wrong track and whether traditional beliefs really did play a role in the sexual violence. However, we also expressed the assumption that perhaps the traditional practitioners only told us what we wanted to hear, leaving aside the truth of the actual situation.

It should be said that sexual violence and sexual relations with children, in general, are severely punished by law in RDC. This is why some of the traditional practitioners, aware of the existence of this law, protected themselves by denying everything.

Whatever the case, the priority on our return to Likasi was the running of the workshop. Members from all the invited groups took part, except the victims and their families, for there was still too much shame involved in appearing in public. And even though we prefer to work according to the principle of "working *with*" the people concerned and not speaking *"on behalf of"* them, we were almost certain before the workshop started that they would not take part.

The feedback from our research, presented by my colleague Alain Kamwanga, aimed at provoking debate and the participants did not hesitate to react. The diggers asserted that fetishes are often used in the mines and this does not just involve the use of wild plants but also blood. At this point, my colleague intervened to ask the following question: Can we really improve our own lives by destroying someone else's?

The traditional practitioners, who had remained passive up till this point in the discussion, affirmed in response that they had already heard about this practice. They added in unison that, according to their tradition and religion, one could never obtain an advantage for oneself by harming another person. According to them, all those who do harm shall be punished, by God, by the ancestors or quite simply by the courts. And the traditional practitioners concluded that all those who say and/or do otherwise are charlatans.

The diggers answered that they were aware that any advantages obtained from these practices did not last.

Finally, all the workshop participants agreed on the fact that, faced with this scourge, no-one could sit back and remain indifferent and that, to do something, it was more than necessary to carry out some actions in synergy. Thus the workshop opted for an extended awareness-raising campaign in the artisanal mining quarries and sites, where both the diggers and the traditional practitioners work. For this cause, the traditional practitioners agreed to play a key role in the awareness-raising team. For even though our group *in situ* is highly motivated, it is clear that we shall always be considered outsiders in the mines and can scarcely do more than give good advice. On the other hand, the traditional practitioners, who offer to handle such an awareness-raising campaign, possess the requisite authority and credibility for the success of the project.

For our part, our task is to support and guide this work.
The workshop is over but the real work has just begun!

Ulrike von Baggehufwudt
Peace education officer
SADRI – Service d'Appui au development
Régional Intégré

The difficulties of measuring the impact of peacebuilding efforts

By Julius Nzang and Katharina Schilling***

It is simply a fact that measuring the impact of peacebuilding activities is very difficult, for how can we assess a change in behaviour, an adjustment in attitudes or an alteration of thinking — not only in one individual but in a society at large?

Therefore, to properly evaluate the impact of the peace work in the PCC (Presbyterian Church in Cameroon), defining the scope of partnership involved, in at least a general sense, could shed more light. The key players are PCC and CPS (EED) currently targeting Youth, especially the active members and leaders of the Youth Movement of the PCC (Christian Youth Fellowship – CYF). Professionally, the peacebuilding and conflict transformation project (in short peace project) is handled by CPS while the PCC provides a platform for implementation, practice and results. The project's impact is a function of goals that serve as a reflection of the CPS' vision of peace work in Cameroon. These goals range from instigating and conveying results of changed behaviour and attitudes towards peace matters such as conflicts and violence. Bearing in mind that communication is the main tool for

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understanding and exchange, efforts are made to help youths acquire knowledge and skills for improving communication. In other words, working on listening to others and expressing oneself nonviolently, is fundamental in peace work, including violence prevention and conflict transformation. Improving communication also means giving the youths a voice to actively participate within and outside the religious confines of their social context. Attaining such goals may be the high points of our peace work towards this end. Peace work in this light serves to achieve a more just environment, effective cooperation and positive developments.

To date, we have organized more than 22 training sessions on the subject of peace building and conflict transformation. As already mentioned, these sessions so far have involved mainly young people. More than 300 youths from 25 Presbyteries nationwide have gone through peacebuilding training on different levels[1]. The acquisition of knowledge and skills during the training is backed by the production and use of appropriate learning materials[2]. Additionally, many trainees have had the opportunity of obtaining new insight into and discussing various ways and means of making societies more just by watching films such as Gandhi or Martin Luther. These different methods and approaches aim at redefining and making provisions for deeper insight on the subject from the basis of "young people" who can so easily be manipulated negatively.

We observed a drastic change in opinion in most trainees who did not even want to attend peacebuilding training initially. Expressions included: "I did not want to attend the training as I did not see any reason to discuss peace. We in Cameroon live in peace, so why should I misuse my time when I have more important things to do for my life?"

1 Three modules that build on the previous one with the following focus: I – basic knowledge on peacebuilding, communication, conflict, violence; II – conflict analysis; III – conflict transformation and nonviolence.

2 Handouts on each topic, resource book with background information on each topic, methods and games to facilitate.

But, by the end of the first training course, many realized they would have missed a whole lot if they hadn't taken part. Generally, feedback in training is given by trainees on a daily basis and at the closing using a variety of methods (games, verbally, written). This feedback is positive throughout, concerning the usefulness of content and the effectiveness of the methods and materials used. To just quote some feedback: "I never thought about other ways on how to discipline children than beating. But now I learned that this kind of violence might harm them. I will try to reduce beating, and to take time to listen to them and to make them understand their limits by dialogue." "Had I known before what deep rooted reasons conflicts can have, I would have found ways and means to find solutions instead of continuously quarrel about the consequences. It will be my first thing when back, to try to find a solution for our long lasting family problem." "Conflicts have a positive side — that was new to me. I tried to avoid conflicts in the past as I do not like to quarrel with others. I try to change and use what I have learned here to create stronger relationships."

The peacebuilding trainees usually already have tremendous conviction by the end of the first module that they want to quickly dash out the newly acquired knowledge and skills of peace work. By the time of the next training module, most invitees show up. In many, ideas about peace have already grown deeper and some of their initial thoughts on topics such as conflict have been corrected. This is noted by their mode of interaction and progress on vital points during group work and plenary discussions.

Thus, the training of members and leaders in the CYF as multipliers is not limited to their personal advancement but includes encouraging them to spread the message of peace. The extension is that though they are CYF members, they also belong to a larger socio-cultural context. This is their playing field, where they can create awareness and spread knowledge. To do this, they have the task of adapting their newly-acquired theoretical knowledge on peacebuilding and utilizing it within the family, among friends, in the workplace or associations. It

is with respect to this that they are asked to write reports on their peacebuilding activities; and if partaking, present them during the next level of training.

Additionally, the trainees have been asked to enlighten us about the impact of peace work on their personal lives. They do report verbally and in writing testimonials about changing personal behaviour, the social manners in their families and living quarters and how others look up to them for support on conflict transformation.

Some quotations will highlight this:

Kuchonde Nyikoh, Fako South: … Fourthly, the peace building and conflict transformation course has taught me how to communicate with people and to understand the meaning of their action. The things they say in action. I can speak now in a way that will hardly escalate into conflict.

Munia Esther, Ndop: … I have learned that conflict is a natural and necessary part of life. In the past I was fond of avoiding conflict which I now know it is not the best thing to do but instead I have to face and treat it accordingly. I used to keep silent when ever somebody makes me angry but deep in me I am angry with that person. But with this training if somebody annoys me, I immediately open up and we will prevent the problem from escalating. At times I get so surprised at myself, if really I am the one behaving like that …

Bongmba Ernest, Batibo: … The training … changed my reaction to situations, other people's ideas as well as corrective measures. With the understanding that each individual is unique, I now take much time to find out why someone behaves in one way or the other.

Columbus Akum, Fako North: … it (peacebuilding training) has changed my poor attitude, behaviour and morals. I use to be very angry, aggressive and challenge many time by conflict. But now I am a different person. I can control myself and can transform conflict. … I was able to resolve a long time conflict that was between me and my brother, because of family properties. … This knowledge has manifested a lot of things in me in such a way that I see myself as a container that has been empty but is filled right up to the brim.

Fomujong Joan Ngum, Fako South: I used to be so aggressive before and almost all the time that I am annoyed, I acted in anger rather than in a peaceful way. I used to shout at my classmates and made some of them and even boys to be scared of me. I hardly waited for someone to express him/herself. I will always threaten to beat and even beat sometimes. … But, after the first training I took it to be personal. I fought with myself internally and tried to adapt and make what I have learned a lesson, first, to myself. … I decided to change because I had the interest in and I wanted to teach others.

Cynthia Akendum, Fako South: … I have introduced a general view from the training to my CYF group and taught specifically the topics communication and conflict. My group especially the sisters are improving with the rates of being in one terms and better managing their conflicts, problems and small arguments.

Tayong Marcel, Mamfe: … My life before the training … is quite different from what it is now. … but I strongly thought violence was the ideal in certain circumstances. I've had a transformation in some domains in my life. … As a teacher, many of my students have met me and even colleagues have confessed that "I've reduced beating". They say I used to beat too much and that's why many were afraid of me. Within the past months I tried to talk things out with students when a conflict arises either between students and also between

> myself and students. … I've had many friends come to me to report conflicts in which they are involved. I began to wonder why they had confidence in me. Even on matters concerning marriage I've been consulted. … Whenever there is a mix up amongst brethrens …, I'm always invited and I've noticed they always like to hear what "teacher" as they call me, will say. Many times when I talk, those involved will say "that's final". I think the peace training has done much to help me rule and teach.

Without doubt there has been a major increase in the awareness concerning the contents, causes and effects of conflict and violence as well as on the wider area of peace. What and how to improve communication also falls into this category of raising awareness.

In view of the fact that most of the impact is on behavior and attitude, a considerable change in behavior can be observed since the peacebuilding project started. For example, the trained youths increased their awareness of the effects of certain words, behaviour and practices on others. Consequently they take caution in action which results in being more considerate and empathic towards each other. This is backed up by the fact that youths from various regions, backgrounds and cultures interrelate during training and this creates a nationwide peace-network. They exchange ideas and discuss the topics even after the official training sessions. In this way, clarification and corrections are done resulting in deeper understanding.

The capacity of individual trainees has been reinforced and built up. Some of those who wouldn't talk in public are now capable of speaking out loud because they are convinced of the necessity to inform and/or train others.

Personal potentials have been discovered as many create songs, write poems or act in dramas on peace. Some examples:

Tools for Peacebuilding

by Munia Esther Meluh, Ndop

Where there is peace people are happy
Where there is peace people are united
Where there is peace there exist love
But I am in a pre-phase of violence in my country
What can I do not to enter the hot phase?

I will buy guns and explosives so that when my people see it,
they will be afraid to war
I will starve my people so that they will not have energy to war
I will not create job opportunities so that they will have no funds
to afford war material
Yes, when I do this I will have perfect peace!

No my dear, you cannot achieve peace by doing all these.
To achieve peace you must be a good peace maker.
Dialogue with your people, accept differences, educate your people
to know the damages of violence and also the importance of peace
in our communities.
When you do these things, you will have perfect peace.

Peace a Necessity

Neba Stephanie Ngefor, Bafut Tubah

Conflict and violence
Escalate and skyrocket
Hope despairs
Flowers of trust wither
The star of love disappear
The dove of peace vanish
Aggressors approach nearer
Shall I give up?

I will empathize not sympathize
Dialogue and not aggress
For when peace appear
It encompasses all odds
Surpasses all conflict and violence
A formidable force that knows no boundary, enmity and sees
    the heart of individuals.
For its arrival, we blink
Like rainbow with multiple colours.

Conflict

by Mike Mundi, Bafoussam

Conflict is a vice
As cold as ice
Does not have a price
Cannot be good as rice
It seems little as mice
But as dangerous device

Oh!!! You cause much aggression
Leading to suppression
Resulting in victimization
However arises to forceful migration
Encouraging dispersion
Leading to separation
That instills a negative perception
Causing an antagonizing reaction

We need a positive reaction
Full of a virtuous solution
Creating a good impression
That may lead to positive importation
Making us a new creation
Thereby ensuring a bright generation

So no more racism
Reject sexism
Deny antagonism
Say no to tribalism
Refuse mysticism
Discard favoritism
No more scandalism

War

by Ndole Ewang Hervé, Douala

Oh war where do you come from
Give us your real identity
You that people tremble at the pronunciation of your name
You that emanates from lack of genuine love
Absence of justice, the presence of hatred and distrust.

Look at your piteous, sad and horrible achievements
You succeeded in breaking families, homes, tribes and friends
You have brought a lot of melancholy to your numerous victims
You take away innocent souls to their untimely graves
You have destroyed our environment, our economy and now have remain
Jobless, hungry and homeless, oh how sad!

I can't play again with my friends along the road
We can't meet to laugh and fellowship together anymore
Where is my mother
Where is my brother
Where are my friends, they are no more!!

You, not even worthy to pronounce, led them into the cold helpless hands of death.
Now I say, enough is enough, will you gather your luggage of hatred, corruption, injustice and go to the deepest valley of "no come back".
Now I have made up my mind to fight you
With every iota of my being to expel you from our presence to combat you with these words
Love, justice and above all the Fear of God.

We should also mention here the usefulness of the materials produced in the sense that they support and refresh the memory. Many trainees report that they lend their handouts to others or distribute copies during their local training. Additionally, many voice their desire to obtain the finalized resource book for further studies. This is also a sign of great interest concerning peacebuilding and conflict transformation.

But all the issues mentioned still leave us with some of the profound difficulties faced in evaluating and monitoring the impact on peacebuilding.

Apart from reducing the number of violent incidents or physical damage to people, how can we measure the change in people? What could be provable indicators of change? How can an attitude or thinking be measured and how can its changes be verified? Since no clear data on issues like these could be collected before or at the start of the project, there are limits to what would permit an indisputable evaluation of the peace project.

There is also a problem in proving the verisimilitude of what the youths report they have done and what they have actually done. Thus we insist on being present when they organize sessions or training, or carry out any other peace activity. If we can develop an effective monitoring system, we have the possibility of experiencing and at least trying to evaluate the transfer of acquired knowledge, the level of understanding, and we may even have the chance to make immediate corrections.

PEACE BUILDING

by Relindis M. Bengu, Buea

P – Pray, play and pay attention as you go about analyzing every conflict
E – Enjoy every step as you listen to the parties involved
A – Act while the conflict is still very small
C – Celebrate difference it brings unity
E – Every effort put in every stage shall produce results, do it
B – Bring out all possible causes of any conflict before you begin your analysis
U – Understand the issues the way they are presented
I – Identify the key actors and their relationship with each other
L – Listen more and ask questions or clarification
D – Do not interpret actions and neither should you assume issues
I – Inquire to know the position, interest and needs of all the parties involved
N – Never hush any party from speaking; this only helps to escalate the conflict
G – Go, Go and spread the good news of peace wherever you find yourself. Give out your best it's worth it.

APPENDIX

FriEnt

Working Group on
Peace and Development

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FriEnt
is a Working Group of: Bread for the World – Protestant Development Service (BfdW-EED) | Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) | Civil Peace Service Group | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH | Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) | Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) | Heinrich-Böll-Foundation (hbs) | Misereor/Catholic Central Agency for Development Aid | Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management/Institute for Development and Peace (INEF)

Workshop:
Education building peace?!
This essay is based on a presentation by Professor Lynn Davies at a workshop in December 2012, jointly organised by FriEnt and on behalf of BMZ/Division Education by the GIZ/Sector Programme Education. The participants addressed the need to deepen the understanding and analysis of theories of change on which interventions in the field of development and peace-building are based on.

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Education, change and peacebuilding

By Lynn Davies

1. Introduction

In this essay change relates to two types: the changes that a population may experience in conflict contexts; and the changes that policy interventions want to achieve in order to promote a more peaceful society through education. It is immediately clear that these two sorts of change may in themselves conflict.

The paper uses the framework of complexity science to cast a critical eye on assumptions about how change occurs. It first briefly outlines the features of complex adaptive systems before moving to education and conflict. It examines hindrances to change before contrasting these with the benefits of complexity mind-sets in programming. This raises dilemmas for policy makers, but the final conclusions try to outline some parameters which can inject realism into our struggles at peacebuilding.

2. Complexity and Adaptation as a starting point

Complex adaptive systems (CASs) such as in the social sphere or socio-economic systems, share characteristics that enable evolutionary change and survival.

- The complexity of interactions in a system means that change is non-linear, in the sense that there is no simple cause and effect which takes the same shape in different contexts. This is why so many school effectiveness studies are doomed to failure, in trying to import 'best practice' across wildly differing contexts.
- A key feature is that a CAS is self-organising, with no apparent leader.

- It learns from 'mistakes', but recognizes and capitalises on them without the need for a director.
- In complex systems seemingly random events can create huge change and spark unpredictable evolutionary shifts. In conflict terms, we know how rumours can become amplified, so that others who have lived together peacefully become fatally constructed as enemies and objects of hate. There can also be bifurcation and polarisation, as we know well in education terms — that successful schools become more successful, that failing students slide down into more failure, as agents interpret and position themselves and others in the system.
- There is structure — 'rules' — in a CAS, but there is also organisation in the sense of having 'agents' with flexibility and creativity.

All this has profound implications for how we consider change as well as how we consider conflict.

'Chaos' has been conceptualised as extremely complex information, rather than as an absence of order.

3. Is the best that we can do to 'do no harm'?

There is now substantive recognition of the highly complex role that education plays in conflict (see a previous FriEnt Essay by Alan Smith 2011). Schools can contribute to conflict by ethnic or religious segregation, through the normalisation of violence, through unequal outcomes which lead to frustration and tension, through extreme nationalism, and through teaching passive acceptance of (malevolent) authority. On the positive side, we think that education can promote stability through providing livelihoods and resilience, by enhancing communication and language skills, by teaching conflict resolution, and by giving predispositions to challenge injustice.

One problem is that schools can do all these things simultaneously – and a 'positive' initiative, say in multicultural education, can backfire to become a negative one, as stereotypes are amplified.

The second problem relates to how far education is powerful or powerless in the wider society or economy. Learning about landmine safety does not stop people laying landmines. Drug education does not stop the massive international drug cartels on which whole economies rely.

The third problem is that because societies have designed 'schooling' to occur mainly at the initial stages of people's lives, the intricate webs of interactions that occur afterwards mean that long term effects are almost impossible to predict, let alone control.

A key question is therefore of ambition. Is the best that we can do in education to 'do no harm'? How realistic is it for education to try to be involved in conflict transformation? Is all we can hope for to make schools oases in otherwise conflictual societies? The view of this paper is that the chain of causation in conflict and its transformation is far too long and complicated to hope to make 'recommendations' about peacebuilding. It will be the stance of this paper that perhaps the most we can do is create the conditions where conflict in the future may be marginally less likely. Yet this is a not insignificant aim.

4. Hindrances to change

The failures of attempts to create change in and through education can usefully be understood with a complexity analysis. The first error is the assumption that change is linear, that there are simple solutions. We all have theories of change, that an input at one point will create positive outcomes at the next, and that a chain of events will occur. These theories often relate to our analysis of the cause of conflict. For example, if we think that conflict relates to prejudice, then learning about 'the other' will mean greater acceptance which will mean better community cohesion which will mean less likelihood of manipulation by religious/tribal/ethnic leaders which will mean resistance to supporting conflict. If we think that conflict is caused by unemployed youth, then vocational education will lead to better jobs which will ease frustration which will mean less likelihood of being enticed into armed militias which will mean these have difficulty

recruiting and will be less forceful. If we think that conflict is caused by grievance about minority status, then mother tongue teaching and cultural inclusion into curriculum will promote esteem and security of marginalised groups and less likelihood of opposition.

The list of such linear pathways is extensive. The problem is that they do not always intersect in policy strategies, even within one organisation. Input-output models do not work in social terms, as too many messy contextual factors and power interests intervene. The 'attribution gap' is too huge. Even if conflict were to decrease, it is almost impossible to trace this back to something that happened in education. This is not to say that we should not make attempts to improve the way people live together, but that much has to be done on hope rather than evidence in terms of sustainable impact.

A second hindrance to change is what is termed 'lock-in' or path dependence. Systems can exhibit features which prevent them evolving to better forms. In social systems, these include everything from fundamentalist religious ideology to gendered inequality to acceptance that beating children is the best way to create disciplined peaceful people. Any society exhibits myriad examples of 'the way we do things', where culture becomes entombed or concretized and where histories appear to dictate particular trajectories. Such brakes on adaptability have resonance in our attempts at change. Our task in thinking about points of intervention is how we deal with such frozen, locked-in features of our social world, narratives and historical memories.

A third hindrance can be the assumption that leadership is the key target. What we now know, not just from neuroscience, but from studies of criminal and terrorist networks, is that successful networks do not necessarily have leaders as such. We can learn much both from criminal as well as progressive social movements in terms of how networks form and take on power. While we do want to look at how school principals can be instrumental in school change, the question is whether their school producing more 'successful' students simply means other schools producing fewer, given the rationed nature of educational success.

A final hindrance is the current securitization agenda applied to schools and universities. This creates climates of fear and suspicion, rather than transparency and trust. A weaker version of securitisation is the 'stability' agenda, the idea that just by constructing schools and training teachers, a country will become more stable. This is indeed a change process, but whether this actually leads to peace is not evidenced. The hindrance comes again from linear assumptions and therefore the complacency that progress has been made towards peace. It is usually good to build schools and train teachers, but this is not conflict transformation, especially if the elements within schools that actually contribute to conflict remain unchanged.

5. Using complexity mind-sets

In contrast to linear, hierarchical assumptions about change, using a complexity mindset permits a different way of contemplating intervention. Six interlinked features can be identified here.

1. First, there is being comfortable with experimentation, seeing 'mistakes' or apparent failures simply as information, not as disasters, and being content with divergence from the original plan. There needs to be turbulence for creativity to emerge. This means being relaxed about having only short-term goals, about using constant revisions, and about the means to achieve these goals established in partnership with the participants, not pre-decided.

2. Second is the need for multiple connectivity and multiple-way consultation vertically and horizontally, so that the maximum information channels are opened and responses gauged through a variety of feedback loops. Do we know enough about local multipliers and their networks? What are the co-systems surrounding education? Can we understand patron-client relations rather than deploring them?

3. Third is a stress on horizontalism rather than top-down leadership, learning from how social movements and protests work, and especially from how social media work. Students and teachers have to be recognised as 'activists' or agents within these types of social change, creating and recreating the links, not as recipients. Democracy these days is about retweeting, not referendums.

4. Fourth is the need for political organisation, networking and creating alliances. Sometimes these need to be with uncomfortable partners, even such as the Taliban. A 'principled pragmatism' is called for. Networking also provides greater understanding of 'the enemy' and their motivations — a Taliban example again is their view of 'control of violence' rather than 'non-violence' Can one work with this?

5. Fifth is the search for combinations and pivotal points for change that can be amplified. If this seems opportunistic, it is because it is. A constructivist approach — as in starting where the child is — entails starting where the opposition is. In Afghanistan, one does not even begin discussing human rights with the Taliban. One does not even start with education. Instead one starts with how they want to qualify their doctors or their engineers or their midwives.

6. Finally, there is the need to unfreeze compartmentalised ice-trays such as segregated schools, or to identify and release locked in mentalities surrounding the use of violence or revenge.

6. Dilemmas of (un)certainty

It has to be admitted that not all such mind-sets would be attractive to funders or policy makers. Any intervention needs an aim or rationale, yet this should not result in absolutism. A CAS does not have an end-goal, a Utopian vision of where experiments lead. It simply creates or builds on turbulence in the system, getting to the 'edge of chaos' to 'emerge' into a

better order. A CAS is also not moral as such — it simply learns from what works. But in social terms we do need to impose certain of our values on activity. Funders may not be happy with unpredictability, with risk, with indefinite outcomes, nor with seeing faith as uncertainty, or peace as a process. Therefore we cannot be completely relativistic nor completely open-ended about where change will go. In the social world, complexity insights remain pointers, particularly useful in explaining failure of policy and enabling caution about embarking on expensive pathways which become solidified like lava flows. We need far more 'bad practice' case studies, admitting where interventions, training or workshops had no impact or were even counter-productive. We have to go right back to why we think education is important, and whether we were justified. This is not popular.

7. Conditions and contexts, not grand goals!

Yet we can arrive at some basic principles in a change process in conflict-affected states. Initially comes a reiteration that every conflict context is different, with the interactions taking unique forms and trajectories. There is no recipe for peacebuilding, nor any agreement on what 'peace' might mean in a particular setting. Much is made of the difference between negative and positive peace; but in some contexts negative peace, the absence of war or violence, may be the best we can hope for. Education single-handedly cannot engage in conflict transformation. However, it is not without power and potential.

What can be done is providing the conditions for change and for evolution into something better. This means rather than starting with an end-goal — 'peace' — you start with establishing an educational context which has 'rules' which match your values and where experience tells us can lead to the shifts that we desire. An example of such rules would be human rights — traditionally better seen as a process than as a goal — whereby students, teachers, parents, the community, and administrators all learn and apply the basic tenets of mutuality, respect and dignity. Such values

may have been eroded during conflict. The nice thing about rights is that (unlike sacred texts) they are not a blueprint, they are themselves revisable and discussable, with constant tensions between, say, minority rights to cultural expression and rights relating to gender equality, or between rights of freedom of expression and rights to dignity and freedom from abuse. Such tensions between absolute rights and contingent rights make them very suitable for a complexity approach, as well as the fact that they apply to absolutely everyone, and not just to those who are part of the 'rules' of a particular religion or culture.

Education can also release 'lock-in' and frozen accidents. This is risky, as we see with girls' education in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but providing girls' education can shift community attitudes as well as providing avenues for girls themselves. Galvanising the community around the provision of schooling is a classic example of amplification, as parents themselves gain political and resistance skills. Work on education and extremism will point up the importance of enabling students to live with ambiguity, to have reasonable doubt, not to see the world and others in polarised terms. There is experimentation with various methods to bring this debate safely into the classroom.

Creating enabling conditions means directing the beam on multiple sites. Syntheses of programmes of work in different conflict-affected countries have pointed up the need for engagement with combined targets, in that ignoring one could seriously undermine the rest and indeed the whole programme. These focal points were community involvement, provision of resources, people's understandings of the vision or principles, addressing motivations and incentives in fragile contexts, enabling constant participation in decisions, and establishing legal frameworks to underpin change. Greater success came when there was joint working and multiple communication, experimentation then scaling up, progress in small steps, whole school or network development rather than extracting teachers or principals for training, rights-based approaches, an emphasis on non-violence rather than peace education and ongoing monitoring and evaluation to provide feedback.

There is often debate about whether to start with institutions and hope these will change people, or start with people and hope they will shift the institutions. A complexity approach would resolve this by focussing more on the creation of opportunities and spaces, physical and mental, in which people can try things out, whether different methods or being different themselves. A current example is the project on 'shared schools' in Northern Ireland. Segregated schools, it is admitted, have contributed to sectarian tension. Fully integrated schools have never really taken off, as they also haven't in Sri Lanka, for a variety of reasons. The shared schools project brings students and teachers together across Protestant and Catholic schools for certain classes — and there are now 3000 of such classes.

Central aspects of the project fit nicely with a complexity approach. They are to leave borders where they are but make them less important — as in Europe. (This is the opposite to multiculturalism which privileges difference.) Teachers are experimenting with new arrangements, whether practical logistics around transport or ways to share teaching. The idea is to move from 'best practice' to 'next practice', building up new solutions. Teachers have been trained in network analysis and in being part of a network. There is a philosophy of being tolerant of failure, trying things, saying it doesn't matter if they don't work. The view is that the future is there to be made – maybe this will be towards more integration, maybe it will just stay with this degree of sharing. Bureaucracies thrive on predictability, so the project more or less ignores the officials. The idea of change recognises the Pareto principle of the 80:20 rule: for many events, 80% of the effects come from 20% of the people, or, put another way, 20% of the people can effect big change. Another principle is a different version of the contact hypothesis, known as the 'strength of weak ties': that we learn more from acquaintances than friends. Common identities sound nice but they can create stagnation: one needs to link up with people who think differently, so that boundaries become porous or weak.

As well as values and encounters, education provides skills. As said, employment skills may provide an avenue to stability, but of course this

depends on job availability. For a society to emerge, the key skills for students are to learn to be change agents themselves. These skills may indeed be the personal ones for self-promotion, for getting and holding jobs, but such skills can be linked to a political articulateness which can be harnessed for wider ends. These are the proficiencies in negotiation, debate and lobbying as well as the skills and habits of political organisation. With social media, this is less boring now than in the days of mass leafleting, stuffing envelopes and knocking on doors, but has the same principles of engaging in the basic work to reach people. Students are increasingly using media such as Facebook and Twitter, but their creation of change currently would mostly be to their self-profile or circle of friends, not necessarily to wider social change. Using media for social transformation requires additional skills — learning from jihadi networks if necessary.

8. Monitoring and evaluation

Finally, how does monitoring and evaluation work in such a fluid and experimental approach? It not only works, but is essential. The efficiency of a CAS is built on feedback loops.

As soon as one deliberately creates a turbulence in the system — introducing a rights-based approach, new encounters between students, or parental/community involvement — then this needs monitoring to learn from what is happening. There might well be conventional 'base-lines' for what is hoped/predicted to occur and there would be the establishment of indicators. Yet one key feature would be the participation of students, teachers, parents and communities in the generation of indicators and in the research processes, so that everyone learns. Openness to different types of information is crucial — a simple narrative from a student about how he/she applied their learning in the community, or how they themselves changed as a result of taking part in a debate, is equally useful information to extensive attitude surveys. Monitoring and evaluation of change in a CAS does not really lend itself to positivist approaches, and qualitative, fluid, innovative ways are more appropriate.

Indicators too can remain fluid. As in deradicalisation programmes, does 'success' have to be a change in attitudes and goals, or is it enough that the goals stay the same but the means to achieve them become non-violent? If people can provoke each other without being violent, is that not OK? Another key is the openness to unexpected things happening, and not being restricted to the scrutiny of those 'results chains' which were part of the programme proposal. A final, fundamental point is seeing everything as information. If something does not 'work' then this is equally good information to if it does — sometimes better. If teachers do not understand the deeper reasons for abolishing corporal punishment in spite of workshops or exhortations, and simply use different methods to humiliate students, then one does not give up, but tries a different route to minimising school-based violence.

The whole approach can perhaps be summarized by Byrne's insight:

'Complexity/chaos offers the possibility of an engaged science not founded in pride, in the assertion of an absolute knowledge as the basis for social programmes, but rather in a humility about the complexity of the world coupled with a hopeful belief in the potential of human beings for doing something about it'.

Links & Literature

Education and Peacebuilding: from 'conflict-analysis' to 'conflict transformation'? Essay Series – Part IV Alan Smith | FriEnt | 2011

The role of education in peacebuilding. A synthesis report of findings from Lebanon, Nepal and Sierra Leone. Mario Novell; Alan Smith | United Nations Children's Fund | 2011

Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: An Introduction David S. Byrne | 1998